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FORCIBLE SELF-HELP 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
James J- McHugh 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problcm of Force in Intcrna-
tional Relations_ The proper use of 
force has historically been a preeminent 
concern of mankind. In the domestic 
environment the progress of centuries 
has evidenced the development of a 
highly structured order for the appropri-
ate application of this means of coer-
cion. Societies, bound together by com-
mon heritage and a community of 
interest, have, under the central au-
thority of the state, developed regula-
tions for the use of force covering a 
broad spectrum of situational hypothe-
ses. 
But even in domestic society, signifi-
cant deb~te has arisen as to the proper 
application oC force. Thus, in the cur-
rent milieu in the United States, we 
have wi tnessed discussions on the 
morality of capital punishment and the 
legitimacy of measures of private coer-
cion such as sit-ins and mass demonstra-
tions. 
If domestic societies can still debate 
the appropriate application of force 
internally, how much more difficult is 
the solution of problems surrounding 
the use of force in the international 
community. V{ith a multiplicity of 
sovereign nation-states prosecuting their 
separate national interests and with no 
central authority to manage the expres-
sion of these frequen tly competing in-
terests, it is perhaps a testament to the 
basic rationality of the human species 
that man has not long since destroyed 
himself. 
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And yet he has not. Through centu-
ries of cataclysm and accommodation, 
states have managed, although some-
times just barely, to preserve at least a 
semblance of order, even in circum-
stances of great disorder, by developing 
minimum standards for the proper ap-
plication of force. 1 This essentially neu-
tral energy has been all-pervasive in 
international relations and very fre-
quently misused, but concern for its 
utilization has always been present, and 
it is this concern which prevails as a 
bulwark against the challenge of chaos. 
The Current Conundrum. The ex-
perience of the last 50 years has greatly 
heightened the preoccupation of nations 
with the application of force. World 
Wars I and II have seemingly convinced 
men and nat\ons that at least the uni-
lateral use of armed force by states 
should be foresworn; that its application 
should be surrendered to a central 
authority whose dispassion and objec-
tivity, hopefully, could be counted on 
to at once reduce the chances that force 
would be resorted to and carefully 
circumscribe the mode of its application 
when required. 
At both Versailles and San Francisco, 
men of goodwill attempted to create 
such an authority: in the latter case 
with an even greater sense of urgency 
than in the former. By 1945 the nations 
of the world had witnessed the horror of 
two World Wars and the advent of 
atomic power, and they were fully 
convinced that the control of force had 
become a sine qua non for the con-
tinued existence of mankind. 
Viewed from the perspective of 
1972, however, it can be stated that in 
large measure the United Nations has 
failed to minimize the use of armed 
force. It is true that in the past 27 years 
there has been no worldwide conflag-
ration; but there have been many lesser 
but very bloody conflicts and, by aod 
large, only the residual horror remaining 
from 1945 and the universal fear of an 
apocalypse of thermonuclear power 
have kept leashed the dogs of world 
war. 
The reasons for the failure of the 
United Nations to control the use of 
force are to be found both in the 
environment of its birth and the charac-
ter of its principal legislative instrument. 
The U.N. was created during a period of 
temporary consensus as a reflection of 
the chaotic upheaval of World War II. 
As a result there was enacted in its 
charter a body of aspirational interna-
tional law which depended for its effec-
tiveness on the continued consensus of 
the Great Powers of the world. The 
United Nations had en esse arrogated to 
itself the competence to use armed 
force to redress wrongs; but when the 
Great Power consensus evaporated, this 
competence became a nUllity.2 
This is the conundrum that has 
plagued the nations of the world ever 
since: the riddle of an organization with 
authority and no power; the paradox 
of a world where states have rights but 
have ostensibly foresworn their reme-
dies to an institution that, by and large, 
can insure no redress for wrongs; the 
need to honor an instrument which has 
become, for many states, the supreme 
law of the land while at the same time 
recognizing that full honor and com-
plete compliance with the spirit and 
even the letter of that instrument are 
beyond the capability of sovereign 
states with conflicting and often selfish 
national interests. 
State Response. Construing their ac-
tions most charitably, it can be stated 
that in the face of this dilemma the 
several states of the United Nations have 
done the best they could to strike an 
accommodation between the mandates 
of the charter and the requirements of 
their own national interests. Ry and 
l,tl"ge, they have Cldhered to the principle 
that armed force can no longer be 
justified simply as an instrument of 
national policy and that armed aggres· 
sion, whatever its precise meaning, 3 is a 
criminal act. However, states have con-
tinued, in practice, to resort to the use 
of armed force. They have employed 
traditional measures of forcible self-help 
short of war and have attempted to 
justify this action on the basis of the 
charter, and too often this has become 
purely a game of semantics.4 
Such a modus operandi would not 
necessarily bode ill for the creation of a 
body of regulations for the realistic 
management of international force. It 
could even be envisaged as a dev.elop-
ment somewhat parallel to that experi-
enced in the United States and Great 
Britain where common law evolved both 
under and together with constitutional 
instruments. However, with no central 
authority for enforcement and no com-
pulsory jurisdiction to achieve objective 
interpretation, a distinct pattern of 
developing legitimate/illegitimate state 
practice is difficult to discern. If a body 
of international law on forcible self-help 
is emerging under the charter, it is more 
a random happenstance than a con-
sidered development by dispassionate 
and objective judicial ratiocination. 
Result of SLate Response. The state 
response of employing measures of 
forcible self-help and then attempting to 
rationalize them under the charter has 
led to considerable confusion. Tortuous 
legal reasoning has been applied to 
justify actions clearly beyond the pale 
of the charter.5 Inconsistent Security 
Council reaction has elaborated the con-
fusion,6 and finally, the dearth of judi-
cial pronouncements has compounded 
matters even further by precluding any 
real development of authoritative prece-
dent.? 
As a consequence, frustration and 
cynicism have grown apace. Both de-
cisionmakers and scholars have fre-
quently fa1len victim to one or the other 
of these twin devils. It has been con-
tended that the use of force is an area 
beyond the competence of international 
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law, that in the absence of a true 
international consensus the control of 
force must remain in a legal no man's 
land.8 It has even been advanced that 
the function of international law in the 
control of force is simply to provide the 
best possible justification for political 
acts and in no way is it relevant as a 
consideration in the development of 
policy. 9 
Along with these counsels of despair, 
however, there is in evidence a growing 
realism concerning the appropriate func-
tion of the law in the application of 
force by states under the charter: a 
realism which neither admits of irrele-
vancy nor pretends to omnipotence but 
rather seeks the middle ground between 
"the Charybdis of subservience to state 
ambitions and the Scylla of excessive 
pretensions of restraint." 1 0 
This school of realism views the 
world as seeking at least a minimum 
public order and conservation of human 
values and perceives the function of the 
law as a process of decision making to 
the achievement of this end. 11 Rigid 
concepts of legality and illegality in the 
application of force, particularly in the 
absence of compUlsory jurisdiction, are 
viewed as distinctly unhelpful. Rather, 
empirical norms are sought which will 
provide at least a modest body of 
consensual regulation, and as the habit 
of consensus grows, so will the law. It is 
contended that state conduct should be 
justified or condemned on the basis of 
its rationality and restraint under all the 
circumstances, rather than on the basis 
of how said conduct comports with an 
arbitrary standard of legality which does 
not possess consensual content. 
The net result of this approach does 
not afford the law as exalted a position 
in the order of international hierarchy 
as some might desire, but its proponents 
would contend that vis-a-vis the use of 
force, international society is primitive 
at best, and if the law is to thrive in 
such an environment it must not aspire 
to more than it can achieve. 12 
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Purposc of This Essay_ With this 
concept in mind, the present essay will 
consider that mode of force to which 
states have frequently resorted since 
1945, i.e., forcible self-help, and at-
tempt to elucidate some practical cri-
teria which decisionmakers might apply 
in a situational context to determine 
whether a proposed use of force is 
legitimate. To do this it will be helpful 
to first examine the customary law of 
forcible self-help as it existed prior to 
the U.N. Charter. Next, the proscrip-
tions and prescriptions of the charter 
will be considered and, subsequently, 
state practice under the charter, Se-
curity Council actions in response to the 
use of force, such judicial decisions as 
exist, and authoritative commentary in 
the area. 
Hopefully, ilrom this analysis it will 
be possible to indicate certain state 
conduct which is clearly legitimate and 
other activity which is equally clearly 
subject to condemnation. Between these 
poles there will obviously be a broad 
gray area, but it is in this area that 
certain inchoate normative conduct may 
be discernible which can provide a 
suggested pattern for decisionmaking 
with a high order of probability that the 
use of force in a given instance can be 
legitimated. 
It should be noted that the emphasis 
throughout is on measures of forcible 
self-help, forcible in the sense that 
armed force is applied or threatened. 
The numerous other means of coercion 
utilized in international relations, while 
of considerable significance in interna-
tional law, must of necessity be rele-
gated to a position of incidental refer-
ence in the current undertaking. 
Whether the effort to enunciate prac-
tical guidelines will be successful re-
mains to be seen, but it is considered a 
most necessary endeavor. There has 
been much too much of the frustration 
and cynicism referred to above. Deci-
sionmakers have, with considerable jus-
tification, fre~uently thrown up their 
hands after attempts to assay what 
guidance the law offers in this area and 
have fallen back on post-factum ra-
tionalization. And yet even this cynical 
approach is a response to an intuitive 
appreciation that the awesome power 
which force can exhibit demands great 
circumspection in its application. For as 
Richard Falk has eloquently noted: 
"Among the most profou~d quests of a 
moral man is knowledge about the 
proper use of force in human relations, 
for force entails a wide range of claims 
over life and death. As such it expresses 
the limiting condition of mortality.,,13 
THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF FORCIBLE SELF-HELP 
The Gcneral Nature of Forcible Self-
Help. Forcible self-help as a means of 
coercion short of war is an ancient and 
obvious principle to which societal com-
munities have had frequent recourse in 
the conduct of international relations. 
As long ago as 431 B.C. a treaty 
between the Mediterranean city-states 
of Oeantheia and Chalaeum attempted 
to regulate resort to this mode of 
conduct.! 4 
Self-help is, of course, the creature of 
a decentralized society, be it national or 
international. In the .course of history, 
resort to self-help has waxed and waned 
in relationship to the degree to which 
society was integrated or diffused. Thus 
the establishment of the Roman Empire 
seems to have eliminated practices of 
self-help in the territory under Roman 
rule; again after the dissolution of the 
Holy Roman Empire and the diminu-
tion of the power of the Pope self-help 
flourished.! 5 In more recent times, the 
full flowering of the nation-state system 
with its accent on sovereign indepen-
dence created a condition in interna-
tional relations in which measures of 
self-help were vital to the protection of 
state interests. 
Across this historical spectrum, while 
the legitimacy of self-help was clearly 
recognized so were its inherent dangers, 
and, accordingly, attempts to regulate 
the means and methods of self-help have 
been as consistently in evidence as the 
instances of a recourse to the device. I 6 
Out of this effort has developed a body 
of international law which, with varying 
degrees of success, has categorized and 
defined legitimate measures of forcible 
self-help and prescribed rules for their 
utilization. Under the classical system of 
international law, these measures could 
be divided into three main legal cate-
gories: (a) self-defense, (b) reprisals, and 
(c) intervention. I 7 
Self-Defense. A state's right of self-
defense was considered paramount 
under customary international law. And 
yet a precise definition of this right is 
difficult to\ discover. In the 19th cen-
tury, statesmen and writers frequently 
equated the right with a "right" of 
self-preservation. I 8 Yet it has been 
noted. that such a definition is so exten-
sive as to destroy the imperative charac-
ter of any system of law by making all 
obligation to obey the law conditional. 
It has been suggested that rather than 
equating self-defense with self-preserva-
tion, it should be recognized that self-
preservation for both states and individ-
uals is an instinct rather than a legal 
right. While in a given situation the 
instinct might prevail over a legal duty 
not to do violence to others, a society 
espousing any kind of order ought not 
to admit that it is lawful for it to do 
SO.19 
The foregoing suggests that, in cus-
tomary law, self-defense became recog-
nized as a more limited right than that 
enunciated in the 19th century. This 
view is generally borne out by the 
practice of states. At least after 1920 
legitimate self-defense typically appears 
in the context of the threat or use of 
force. It was considered as a reaction to 
imminent or actual violence rather than 
as justified by any violation of the legal 
rights of a state or of its subjects? 0 
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Probably the best statement of the 
conditions for the exercise of self-
defense in customary international law 
is the definition formulated even earlier 
by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 
the Caroline incident.2 I 
In 1837 during an insurrection in 
Canada, the steamer Caroline was being 
used to transport to Canada men and 
materials for the rebels from American 
territory across the Niagara River. The 
Government of the United States was 
not p'reventing this activity, and, accord-
ingly, a body of Canadian militia 
crossed the Niagara into U.S. territory 
and after a scuffle, in which some 
American citizens were killed, sent the 
Caroline over the falls. In the conten-
tion which followed, the issue was 
raised as to whether the conditions for 
the exercise of the right of self-defense 
had been met. Webster formulated a test 
which has since met with general ac-
ceptance. He noted that self·defense 
must arise out of an instant and over-
whelming necessity, leaving no choice of 
means and no mcment for deliberation. 
Additionally, the action taken must 
involve nothing unreasonable or exces-
sive "since the act justified by the 
necessity of self-defense must be limited 
by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it.,,22 
The rule of the Caroline case was 
subjected to some criticism on grounds, 
inter alia, that the conditions it pro-
nounced were somewhat vague. Be that 
as it may, the case is generally recog-
nized as an authoritative pronounce-
ment of customary international law, 2 3 
and if state practice is taken together 
with the Caroline case, a reasonably 
clear basis for the exercise of the cus-
tomary right of self-defense emerges: 
• Its exercise must be in response to 
actual or threatened violence. 
• The actual or threatened violence 
must be of such a nature as to create an 
instant and overwhelming necessity to 
respond, and 
• The response taken must not be 
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excessive or unreasonable in relation to 
the violence being inflicted or threat-
ened_ 
Reprisals. While self-defense in cus-
tomary international law can be viewed 
as a reaction by states to violence being 
inflicted or threatened by another state, 
reprisal is a means of forcible self-help 
to redress wrongs already inflicted. Self-
defense as a means of self-help is recog-
nized in both international and domes-
tic law. Reprisal is not. At least in 
modem times, reprisal is unique to the 
international arena. In domestic society 
central authority is frequently unavail-
able to forestall the immediate threat of 
force, and hence the doctrine of self-
defense has prevailed; but in the absence 
of immediacy there are institutions and 
methods in m~dern domestic society to 
peacefully redress wrong, and hence 
retaliatory self-help is not endorsed.2 4 
The first legal doctrine to emerge was 
one involving private reprisals. In Eng-
lish practice acts of private reprisal first 
made a significant appearance in the late 
13th century. They were characterized, 
typically, by the seizure of goods and 
property on the high seas. By the late 
15th and the 16th centuries, reprisals by 
private seizure had become a generally 
recognized method of forcible self-
help.25 
Private reprisals prevailed until the 
18th century. During their existence 
they had certain unchanging character-
istics. They were authorized by the 
sovereign of an individual against whom 
an alleged crime had been committed 
(generally robbery or failure to pay a 
debt) by a subject or agent of another 
state. Additionally, the legal right to 
pursue reprisals rested upon the pre-
existence of a denial of justice. By this 
was meant that redress had been sought 
from the sovereign of the injuring party 
but to no avail. Finally, retaliation was 
to be had against the property and 
people of the offending state for an 
amount susceptible of expression in 
pecuniary terms and equivalent to loss 
plus reasonable costs? 6 
In general, the practice of private 
reprisals acquired a high degree of uni-
formity in international law. Regula-
tion, both local and by treaty, carefully 
channelized the evolving doctrine into a 
fairly structured method of achieving 
redress of certain amounts under con-
trolled conditions.2 7 Thus the potential 
abuses of the system were kept reason-
ably in check. Occasionally, however, 
when reprisals were used for political 
purposes, as in wars of reprisal, they 
departed from established norms and 
became unpredictable. This unpre-
dictability was the chief characteristic 
of public reprisals, which superseded 
private reprisals in the 18th century. 
The distinguishing aspect of public 
reprisals was the authorization of sei-
zures as a punishment of the offending 
state. They were carried out by states, 
as opposed to individuals, and although 
based on the notion of denial of justice 
for a wrong committed, the wrong did 
not have to be against any individual 
person nor were the seizures limi ted by 
any notions of loss plus costs. 2 8 
Measures of reprisal commonly used 
included: (a) embargo of the offending 
state's ships found in the waters of the 
wronged state, (b) seizure of the in-
juring state's ships on the high seas, and 
(c) pacific blockade of the coasts of the 
offending state against the ships of that 
state.29 
In the Naulilaa arbitration of 192830 
there appears the most authoritative 
statement of the customary law of 
reprisal. In October 1914, while Portu-
gal was still neutral, a party from 
German Southwest Africa entered Por-
tuguese African territory. A misunder-
standing arose due to the incompetence 
of the German interpreter; shots were 
fired, and a German official and two of 
his officers were killed. By way of 
reprisal, the Governor of German South-
west Africa sent a punitive force into 
Portuguese territory. The force attacked 
several frontier posts and drove out the 
garrison from Naulilaa. In the evacuated 
area a native uprising occurred, the 
suppression of which necessitated a con-
siderable expedition by the Portuguese. 
A special arbitral tribunal considered 
Germany's responsibility for all that had 
ensued. Germany contended that her 
action was a legitimate reprisal. The 
arbitrators rejected this plea. In so doing 
they noted: 
Reprisals are acts of self-help by 
the injured State, acts in retali-
ation for acts contrary to interna-
tional law on the part of the 
offending State, which have re-
mained unredressed after a de-
mand for amends. In consequence 
of such measures, the observance 
of this or that rule of interna-
tional lhw is temporarily sus-
pended in the relations between 
two States. They are limited by 
considerations of humanity and 
the rules of good faith, applicable 
in the relations between States. 
They are illegal unless they are 
based upon a previous act con-
trary to international law. They 
seek to impose on the offending 
State reparation for the offence, 
the return to legality and the 
avoidance of new offences.3 1 
From this statement three conditions 
for the legitimacy of reprisals in cus-
tomary law can be discerned: 
• There must have been an illegal act 
on the part of the target state. 
• Demand for redress must be made 
and redress not provided, and 
• The measures taken must not be 
excessive, Le., out of all proportion to 
the act which motivated them. 
Quite obviously, the foregoing condi-
tions did not provide a sure and certain 
blueprint for taking legitimate reprisals 
in any given case. There were questions 
as to whether demand for redress must 
always be made, even when it was 
obvious that none would be afforded 
and when Mfective retaliation made 
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time of the essence. Likewise, there 
were learned debates on what in any 
given context amounted to proportional 
response. Finally, there was contention 
as to what state acts were illegal in 
international law so as to permit taking 
reprisals in the first place.32 Neverthe-
less, as a general proposition, the rule of 
the Naulilaa incident fulfilled the task 
of enunciating concepts, with a con-
sensus in state practice, which served to 
provide decisionmakers with useful 
standards against which to measure their 
policies and consequently preserve at 
least minimum conditions of order and 
restraint in the use of force. 
Inlervenlion. This final category of 
self-help is the most amorphous of the 
three, being more a method of applying 
force than a conceptual basis or justifi-
cation for its use. The legitimacy of 
intervention is, by and large, to be 
found in other categories of self-help. 
Thus in customary law there were inter-
ventions in the affairs of other states by 
way of reprisal {as in the Naulilaa 
incident) or for purposes of self-defense 
(as in the Caroline case). 
But interventions also occurred when 
neither of these bases was present. It has 
been noted that on many occasions in 
the 19th century the Great Powers 
intervened in the affairs of other states 
in order to impose the settlement of a 
question which threatened the peace of 
EUrope. This type of intervention was a 
dictatorial interference with the inde-
pendence of other states. It was only 
justified if it was authorized by treaty 
or was undertaken to protect nationals 
of the intervening state abroad. Beyond 
this intervention was based on sheer 
power rather than law. 3 3 
Additionally, there was some support 
for the notion that states could inter-
vene in a foreign state for humanitarian 
purposes, i.e., to prevent a state from 
commi tting atrocities against its own 
subjects, but such support was far from 
unanimous. The prevailing view was that 
146 
a state's treatment of its own subjects 
was a matter exclusively within its own 
jurisdiction.34 Humanitarian interven· 
tion in this context cannot truly be 
conceded therefore as a part of positive 
customary international law. State prac-
tice would seem to have cynically rele-
gated the application of this principle to 
those areas of the world considered 
un-Christian and uncivilized.3 5 
xxxxxxx 
This then was the state of the law of 
forcible self-help at the time of the 
creation of the League of Nations after 
World War 1. Nor was the law signifi-
cantly affected by the League. While 
this organization aspired to shift the 
competencl1 to use force to a corporate 
body rathef than leaving it with individ-
ual states, the focus of the League was 
on precluding war rather than forcible 
measures short of war, and conse-
quently no prohibition against reprisals 
or interventions or limited actions in 
self-defense appear in the covenant. 
It may well have been that resort to 
force, at least by way of intervention or 
reprisal, was inimical to the express 
obligation in the covenant to settle 
disputes by peaceful means. Indeed, 
distinguished authority has made this 
exact point.36 But the fact remains that 
there were no express prohibitions in 
the covenant, and in the only case on 
this point submitted by the Council of 
the League to judicial review, forcible 
self-help was not prohibited. 
The case involved a situation wherein 
Italy in 1923 bombarded and occupied 
the island of Corfu off the coast of 
Greece, claiming that the action was a 
legitimate reprisal for the murder of an 
Italian general by Greek extremists. The 
general had been acting as chairman of 
tlle Greek-Albanian boundary commis-
sion. The League Council presented to a 
committee of jurists the following 
question: 
Are measures of coercion which 
are not meant to constitute acts 
of war consistent with the terms 
of Articles 12 to 15 of the Cove-
nant when they are taken by one 
Member of the League of Nations 
against another Member of the 
League without prior recourse to 
the procedure laid down in those 
articles? 
The jurists replied: 
Coercive measures which are not 
intended to constitute acts of war 
mayor may not be consistent 
with the provisions of Articles 12 
to 15 of the Covenant and it is for 
the Council, when the dispute has 
been submitted to it, to decide 
immediately, having due regard to 
all the circumstances of the case 
and to the nature of the measures 
adopted, whether it should recom-
mend the maintenance or the 
withdrawal of such measures. 
[Emphasis supplied. ] 3 7 
The delphic nature of this reply 
provided solace for all concerned. It was 
interpreted both as prohibiting forcible 
reprisals and as not prohibiting them. 
Objectively, however, the most that can 
be said is that the customary law in 
regard to forcible self-help may have 
been stripped of some of its old security 
by the reply, but it was not changed. 
Accordingly, while incidents of forcible 
self-help diminished between World War 
I and World War II, the law was not 
significantly altered from 1900 until the 
creation of the U.N. Charter in June 
1945.33 
THE U.N. CHARTER AND 
FORCIBLE SELF-HELP 
Force Prohibited. While the League 
Covenant did not significantly affect the 
right of states to resort to forcible 
measures of self-help short of war, it 
did, as noted in previous discussion, 
signal a significant shift in the perspec-
tive of nations vis-a-vis the application 
of force generally. 3 9 A central corpo-
rate authority was viewed as being 
better able to insure that the use of 
armed force was kept to a minimum. 
Unilateral state action was recognized as 
rarely based on real objectivity and 
frequently subject to national myopia 
and even personal whim. 
The League of Nations, of course, 
died for a variety of reasons not perti-
nent to this essay, but the notion that 
competence to apply armed force 
should reside in a central authority did 
not die with it. The idea persisted and 
found expression again, after World War 
II, in the Charter of the United Na-
tions.40 -
The drafters of the U.N. Charter, 
unlike the drafters of the League Cove-
nant, did not make the mistake of 
limiting their\ specific proscriptions to a 
condition of war. They chose rather to 
proscribe the threat or use of force. 
Accordingly, to the extent that pro-
scriptions exist, forcible measures of 
self-help are not excepted, at least not 
by any narrow process of definition as 
was the case under the League Cove-
nant. 
Charter Proscriptions. Article 2, para-
graph 3, of the charter provides that, 
".All Members shall settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace 
and security and justice are not en-
dangered.,,4 I Having made this positive 
pronouncement, paragraph 4 then states 
the negative corollary: ".All Members 
shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations.,,4 2 
The third relevant provision with 
respect to the use of force by states is 
found in article 51 of the charter. This 
article prescribes the conditions for the 
use of force in self-defense. It provides 
that: 
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Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures neces-
sary to maintain international 
peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise 
of this right of self-defense shall 
be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter 
to take at any time such action as 
it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international 
peace and security.43 
Taken together, it can be argued that 
these three provisions present a clear 
and straightforward statement with 
respect to the use of armed force by 
states in international relations. Its use 
is prohibited except in the face of an 
armed attack, and then the use of force 
is permitted only until the Security 
Council acts.44 
The charter then goes on to establish 
in the Security Council the competence 
and capability to employ armed force to 
coun teract threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression. Article 42 provides that 
when economic, diplomatic, and other 
nonforcible sanctions fail, the Security 
Council "may take such action by air, 
sea or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.,,45 Article 43 in 
tum provides that the member nations 
will make forces and facilities available 
to the Council for this purpose.4 6 
Article 47 even creates a Military Staff 
Committee to advise and assist the 
Security Council and be responsible 
under the Council for the strategic 
direction of armed forces placed at its 
disposal. 
In chapter VIII the charter then 
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provides an alternate methodology for 
preserving the peace. It recognizes the 
existence of regional arrangements and 
agencies and notes that these agencies 
have competence to deal with "matters 
relating to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security as are appro-
priate for regional action provided that 
such arrangements or agencies and their 
activities are consistent with the Pur-
poses and Principles of the United Na-
tions. ,,4 7 In addition, regional agencies 
may even take enforcement action, but 
not without authorization from the 
Security Council. 48 
Thus the charter has set up a com-
plete scheme for the transfer of the 
competence to apply armed force from 
individual states to a central supra-
national authority. When its provisions 
are considered \in vacuo, there are lew 
instances where forcible measures of 
self-help by individual states can be 
legitimated. Use of force is prohibited, 
therefore forcible reprisals and interven-
tions are prohibited. Self-defense is per-
mitted until the Council acts, but only 
in the face of an armed attack; although 
when this occurs the party attacked 
may be assisted by its allies, since 
collective self-defense is recognized. 
In short, it has been advanced that 
the customary law in regard to forcible 
measures of self-help has been virtually 
abrogated by the treaty provisions of 
the charter.4 9 This view finds support 
in a recent resolution of the U.N. 
General Assembly. 
In 1970 the General Assembly re-
ceived a report of a Special Committee 
on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion Among States. The report was 
approved and issued as a "Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion J\mong States in J\ccordilnce with 
the Charter of the United Nations."s 0 
The text of the declaration is quite 
lengthy, but a careful reading leads to 
the inescapable conclusion that the 
General Assembly is unquestionably of 
the view that the unilateral use of force 
by states is limited, under the charter, 
to the narrowest possible circumstances. 
It is noted that the threat or use of 
force "constitutes a violation of interna-
tional law and the Charter of the United 
Nations and shall never be employed as 
a means of settling international is-
sues."s I There follows, by way of 
illustration, a variety of specific situa-
tions wherein states are charged not to 
resort to force. In the course of these 
illustrations specific reference is made 
to reprisals and intervention. The dec-
laration notes: "States have a duty to 
refrain from acts of reprisal involving 
the use of force."S 2 With respect to 
intervention, it is provided: 
No State or group of States has 
the right to intervene directly or 
indirectly for any reason whatever 
in the internal or external affairs 
of any other State. Consequently 
armed intervention and all other 
forms of interference or at-
tempted threats against the per-
sonality of the State or against its 
political, economic and cultural 
elements are in violation of inter-
national law. S 3 
Despite the pronouncements of the 
charter and the resolution of the Gen-
eral Assembly, however, if international 
law is properly defined as those rules for 
the conduct of interstate relations to 
which states bind themselves in their 
activities, S 4 then the best that can be 
said for the charter provisions, in light 
of state practice since 1945, is that they 
represent what the world community 
believed the law ought to be rather than 
what it is. It is submitted that the 
members of the United Nations have 
agreed to be bound by the strict charter 
limitations only to the extent that the 
central authority is capable of filling the 
gap left by a state's renunciation of lhe 
right to use force in its own interest.55 
Beyond this, while the charter provi· 
sions remain as a moral proscription 
against the use of force, they cannot be 
said, in actuality, to provide a real test 
of its legitimate application in any 
particular case.S 6 
We must look elsewhere to find 
what, if any, real tests exist for the 
legitimate use of forcible measures of 
self-help. It will be the purpose of the 
next section to attempt to elucidate 
what that test might be. 
FORcmLE SELF-HELP 
SINCE THE CHARTER 
The Effect of the Charter. Although 
the charter does not provide a realistic 
statement of what forcible measures of 
self-help are presently legitimate, we 
cannot simply harken back to the cus-
tomary rules of international law and 
proclaim thc\t these still provide the 
appropriate measure, for the charter has 
left its mark. Although nations still 
employ force against each other, the 
thou shalt not philosophy of the charter 
has had the effect of negating, to some 
extent, general acceptance of the cus· 
tomary law rules. With this in mind it 
will be useful to reexamine the classical 
categories of forcible self-help in an 
effort to determine what state conduct 
is still generally considered legitimate. 
Self-Defense. There is some justifica· 
tion for the contention that since 1945 
the right of self-defense which has re-
ceived general acceptance has a content 
identical with the right as expressed in 
article 51 of the U.N. Charter, i.e., that 
it is limited to being exercised only in 
the case of armed attack.s 7 The terms 
of article 51, or very similar terms, have 
appeared in several important multi-
lateral treaties and draft instruments. 
Article 3 of the Inter·American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 pro-
vided for individual or collective self· 
defense in case of an armed attack. 5 t 
Again, in the Japanese Peace Treaty, 
article 51 of the U.N. Charter is referred 
to expressly. 5 9 Also, the Draft Declara-
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tion on _Rights and Duties of States 
adopted by the International Law Com-
mission in 1949 provided in article 12 
that every state has the right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense against 
armed attack.6 0 
Authoritative publicists also have ex-
pressed the view that the right of 
self·defense is thus narrowly limited. 
They have argued that despite the prob-
lems inherent in the restricted view of 
this right, to permit any more latitude 
than is contained in the wording of 
article 51 would be to open the door to 
so many abuses as to impose an un-
acceptable strain on the requirement of 
international order.6 1 
At the other end of the spectrum 
there is, however, contention that 
forcible measures may be legitimately 
taken in self·defense whenever national 
security is threatened, whether it be by 
specific armed attack, threat of attack, 
or any other direct or indirect aggres-
sion. In this connection Israel has fre-
quently proclaimed that her entire pos-
ture is one of self-defense and that all 
forcible actions taken are taken on that 
basis. In 1966 before the Security Coun-
cil, the Israeli Representative noted 
that: "Whatever we do, whatever our 
government decides to do, it is done in 
order to defend and protect our na-
tional independence and our national 
security. ,,6 2 Again in a Security Council 
debate in March 1969 it was stated by 
the Israeli Representative: "Yesterday's 
Israeli action was an act of self-de-
fense .... Israel has been in a state of 
self-defense since 1948. It will so remain 
until the Arab Governments agree to 
end the war waged against Israel and 
conclude peace.,,6 3 
Also, in the recent India-Pakistan 
conflict one of the claims made by India 
was that her incursion into East Pakis-
tan was in self-defense. Yet it was 
obvious that no attack against Indian 
territory was occurring nor was one 
threatened_ In her view, her security was 
imperiled by the conditions existing in 
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East Pakistan and particularly by the 
great influx of Bengali refugees into 
Indian territory which was depleting her 
slender food reserves.6 4 
Additionally, certain publicists have 
been interpreted as supporting this 
broad view of the right of self· defense. 
In contending that all or at least some 
of a state's "legal rights" may be de-
fended by force, it has been argued, 
rightly or wrongly, that these writers are 
really once again equating the right of 
self-defense with the right of self-preser-
vation. 
Security Council response to claims 
that various resorts to force have been 
in self-defense has not been particularly 
helpful in carving out currently ac-
ceptable conditions for the exercise of 
this right. It would seem, however, that 
the Council, in \general, adopts a restric-
tive view.65 In numerous cases it has 
denounced Israeli action taken osten-
sibly in self-defense but where no spe-
cific attack was occurring.6 6 Likewise 
the Council condemned the actions of 
the British against Yemen in 1964. In 
that instance the British had carried out 
air attacks against Yemen after Yemen 
had made a series of attacks on the 
South Arabian Federation. The British 
argued before the Security Council that 
its actions had been in self-defense, but 
the Council declined to accept this plea 
and condemned the British action as 
"incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.,,6 7 
In between the two extreme posi-
tions discussed above, argument has 
raged pro and con across the entire 
spectrum of possible limitations on the 
right of self-defense, and it is exceed-
ingly difficult to pick a point and say 
"here is where the line can safely be 
drawn." It is submitted, however, that 
wherever the line should be drawn a 
considerable body of opinion would 
argue that the test of the Caroline case 
still presents a generally acceptable set 
of limiting conditions for exercising the 
righ t of self-defense.6 3 
Under this test a nation is permitted 
to use force in self-defense in the face of 
either an actual armed attack or in 
anticipation of such an attack, provided 
there is an instant and overwhelming 
necessity to respond. The argument in 
support of at least this much self-
defense takes the position that it is 
generally consistent with state practice 
and that to limit self-defense short of 
the anticipatory phase at this time is to 
create a condition which is both inade-
quate and totally unrealistic. 
The proponents of this position also 
argue that article 51 of the charter, 
properly interpreted, permits antici-
patory self-defense. Article 51 states 
that nothing shall impair the "inherent 
right of individual or collective self-
defense" [emphasis supplied], and, the 
argument goes, since the inherent right 
al ways included anticipatory self-
defense, it remains legitimate under the 
charter. In answer to the contention 
that the phrase "if an armed attack 
occurs" limits the right, it is argued that 
this phrase is merely descriptive of a 
particular category of self-defense; that 
it was desired to underline that the right 
of individual, and more especially of 
collective, self-defense had not been 
taken away in the process of conferring 
power on the Security Council to take 
preventive and enforcement measures 
for the maintenance of peace.6 9 
But whether article 51 permits antici-
patory self-defense or not, states have 
consistently acted on this basis. More-
over, to limit self-defense to an armed 
attack scenario seriously underestimates 
the potential of contemporary weapons 
systems 7 0 and also discounts even the 
possibility that nonmilitary aggression 
could achieve a level of coercion com-
parable in intensity and proportion to 
an armed attack. 7 1 
R('prisak Of the three categories of 
forcible self-help under discussion, the 
law of reprisals has probably been most 
severely limited since the adoption of 
the U.N. Charter. It has been widely 
conceded that this method of self-help 
is now generally unacceptable.72 Thus 
states have rarely attempted to justify 
their use of force on the grounds of 
reprisal. In the Gulf of Tonkin incident 
the United States argued that its actions 
were taken in self-defense. 7 3 This was 
also the contention of the British in the 
Yemen raid. Also, Israel has argued that 
her forays against the Arabs were ac-
tions in self-defense, although there is 
little doubt that in the precharter era 
many of them would have been charac-
terized as simply reprisal actions. 
Notwithstanding that reprisal is not 
generally accepted as a legitimate basis 
for employing forcible measures of self-
help, there is some indication that retali-
atory action can still be legitimate under 
certain circUImjtances. One illustration is 
to be found in the Corfu Channel 
case.74 
In May 1946 Albanian shore bat-
teries fired without warning on two 
British cruisers making passage through 
Albanian territorial waters in the North 
Corfu Strait. The United Kingdom, 
claiming a right of innocent passage, 
subsequently (in October of the same 
year) sent two British cruisers and two 
destroyers through the strait to assert 
this right. The crews were at action 
stations with instructions to fire back if 
attacked. The two destroyers were 
mined with a heavy loss of life. There-
after, the British sent a large minesweep-
ing force into Albanian waters and 
found a number of newly laid mines. 
Subsequently, the case was referred 
to the International Court of Justice. 
Albania claimed inter alia that the 
British had violated her sovereignty in 
steaming through the strait in October. 
The court on this issue held for the 
United Kingdom. It stated that the 
British mission was designed to affirm a 
righ t which had been unjustly denied, 
and having carried out the action in a 
manner consistent with the require-
ments of international law, the legality 
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of the measure taken could not be 
disputed. 
It has been argued that this decision 
suggests the proposition that what is in 
reality a reprisal action (i.e., a non-
innocent passage of an armed force 
through territorial waters) may be legiti-
mate if its purpose is to affirm a legal 
right against an expected unlawful at-
tempt to prevent its exercise. 7 5 It ap-
pears clear from the Court's con-
demnation of the British for violating 
Albanian territorial waters to search for 
mines after the destroyers were sunk, 
that retaliation simply to obtain redress 
for rights already violated cannot be 
condoned. 7 6 Nevertheless, the case 
would seem to imply that, at least 
exceptionally, a state may be legiti-
mately able to use force in other than 
self-defense and without reference to 
the United Nations in order to secure 
the exercise of certain legal rights. 
Intervention. In discussing the cus-
tomary international law with regard to 
intervention, it was noted that in many 
cases this measure of self-help was legiti-
mate not by virtue of any intrinsic 
justification, but rather because it was 
simply a method of effecting a legiti-
mate reprisal or of acting in self-defense. 
Therefore, insofar as interventions are 
premised on these justifications, they 
are of necessity limited since the charter 
in the same way and to the same extent 
that reprisals and self-defense have been 
limited. 
Beyond this, while states have made 
extravagant claims for the legitimacy of 
intervention utilizing a variety of justifi-
cations, it would seem that there are 
only three circumstances where this 
type of activity has been generally 
accepted: To protect nationals where 
intervention is requested in the face of 
an external threat and in certain special 
cases.77 
The U.S. intervention in the Domini-
can Republic in 1965 is illustrative of 
the first of these circumstances. In that 
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case, during the course of a rebellion, 
the Dominican authorities stated that 
they "could no longer control the situa-
tion, that American and foreign lives 
were in desperate danger and that out-
side forces were required."n In re-
sponse to an urgent appeal from the 
U.S. Ambassador, 400 U.S. Marines 
were put ashore, in the words of Presi-
dent Johnson " ... in order to give 
protection to hundreds of Americans 
who are still in the Dominican Republic 
and to escort them safely back to this 
country.,,79 
The United States was subject to 
severe criticism for retaining its troops 
in the Dominican Republic long after 
any necessity existed for the protection 
of nationals, but its initial actions were 
considered justified by many as a matter 
of urgent ne~essity in order to protect 
the lives of U.S. nationals. II 0 Protection 
of nationals was one of the legitimate 
grounds for intervention in customary 
international law. It is submitted, not-
withstanding the sentiments of the 
General Assembly that states have no 
"right to intervene directly or indirectly 
for any reason whatever in the internal 
or external affairs of any other 
state, " !I 1 that intervention for this pur-
pose in the future would be hard to 
fault. II 2 
The United States and British actions 
in Lebanon and Jordan provide illustra-
tions of the second circumstance in 
which intervention would probably be 
generally acceptable. In both cases the 
respective governments had requested 
United States and British help to assist 
in repelling attempts at subversion di-
rected from a neighboring state. While 
the United Nations was uneasy about 
the activity, neither the United States 
nor the United Kingdom was con-
demned for its actions. By way of 
contrast, the Soviet Union was soundly 
condemned for its armed intervention in 
Hungary in 1956 for the purpose of 
suppressing a popular internal up-
rising. II 3 
It would seem, therefore, that where 
the threat is external and a state re-
quests assistance a third state may legiti-
mately intervene in its behalf. II 4 The 
question of whether the threat is ex-
ternal, however, can prove in itself to be 
highly controversial. Thus there was 
considerable, albeit unjustified, criticism 
of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam on 
the grounds that, like Hungary, Vietnam 
was a case of popular internal uprising 
rather than external threat. lIs Even this 
criticism implies, however, that if in fact 
the threat is external, intervention may 
be legitimately undertaken. 
The third type of circumstance 
wherein it would seem states could 
legitimately intervene within the terri-
tory of another state are the special 
cases of necessity_ 
A serious danger to the territory of a 
state may arise either as a result of a 
natural catastrophe in another state or 
as a result of the other state deliberately 
or negligently employing its natural 
resources to the detriment of the inter-
vening state.1I6 For example, the reser-
voirs of State A on the upper reaches of 
a river might be damaged by natural 
forces posing a threat of flooding to 
State B on the lower reaches. Again, 
State A might negligently or wantonly 
flood the territory of State B. In either 
case, even publicists who take a limited 
view of a state's right to use force have 
conceded that intervention would be 
acceptable provided the injuring state 
has not provided a timely remedy and 
the Security Council is immediately 
advised. II 7 
In the foregoing discussion the at-
tempt has been made to present a 
conservative estimate of the extent to 
which classic measures of forcible self-
help are still generally acceptable in the 
world community. This estimate, how-
ever, hardly represen ts the full spectrum 
of situations in which states hav~ felt 
required to use forcible self-help. Ac-
cordingly, it becomes necessary for 
decisionmakers to know what, if any, 
general criteria exist which can be used 
to evaluate the legitimacy of the use of 
force in the many instances which do 




The Falk Criteria. In light of the 
reaction of the Security Council to 
specific claims and the General Assem-
bly's Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law and in view of the general 
thrust of most authoritative commen-
tary, it is doubtful that state resort to 
force will be endorsed in any situation 
other than those discussed previously. 
This is not to say, however, that all 
other resorts to force will be con-
demned. On the contrary, there is sub-
stantial evidence to suggest that state 
resort to force in a variety of circum-
stances, if not applauded, will at least 
not be indicted.8 II The question for 
consideration then becomes, under 
what specific conditions can resort to 
force by states be rendered tolerable? 
The one word answer to this ques-
tion is "reasonableness." But it is not 
terribly helpful for decisionmakers to be 
told that their conduct will be tolerated 
if reasonable. The term is intuitively 
acceptable as a measure of conduct, but 
it is also extremely vague with reference 
to any given circumstances. It becomes 
necessary, therefore, to determine what 
are the criteria for reasonable state 
conduct with respect to the use of 
force. 
Considerable work has been done by 
legal scholars in an effort to delineate 
these criteria. One effort in particular is 
worthy of evaluation here. Richard A. 
Falk has developed a number of criteria 
which would seem to be relevant.1I9 
They provide that the burden of per-
suasion to legitimate the use of force is 
on the user; that it must connect its use 
of force to the protection of territorial, 
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national, or political integrity; that a 
substantial link must exist between the 
provocation and the claim of retaliation; 
that a diligent effort must be made to 
seek pacific settlement, including re-
course to international organizations; 
that the use of force must be propor-
tional to the provocation and calculated 
to avoid its repetition; that the force 
must be directed primarily at military 
targets; that the user should make a 
prompt explanation of its conduct be-
fore the international community; that 
the use of force must clearly demon-
strate to the target government what 
constituted the provocation; that the 
user cannot achieve its purpose by 
acting within its own domain; that a 
search for pacific settlement should be 
made, recognizing the interests of the 
target state; and that a disposition to 
respect the will of the international 
community must be evident. 
These criteria in general furnish an 
excellent summary of practical condi-
tions for legitimately employing forcible 
self-help. Some criticism is indicated 
however. The fourth criterion requires 
that diligent efforts be made initially to 
obtain satisfaction by pacific means. It 
is submitted that this criterion shou~d 
explicitly state that peaceful solution 
must be attempted, if possible. Without 
specifically indicating this, the impres-
sion is left that peaceful settlement 
must always be attempted. In given 
circumstances such a requirement would 
be completely unrealistic. 
A more serious criticism of Falk's 
effort, however, arises from a considera-
tion of his second criterion. The use of 
force is limited only by the requirement 
that there be a connection between it 
and the protection of territorial, na-
tional, or political integrity. It is sub-
mitted that requiring nothing more than 
a connection raises the distinct possi-
bility that force could be used in such a 
way as to be indistinguishable from the 
polar position of completely un-
inhibited behavior.9o There is always 
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some link which can be estC!blished 
between a desired use of force and the 
broad concepts of national, political, 
and territorial integrity. It is necessary 
that decisionmakers operate under more 
substantial restraints. Accordingly, it is 
suggested that resort to force must 
presuppose the existence of an immi-
nent and significant threat to the con-
tinued existence of a nation's political 
independence and territorial integrity. 
In a word, there must be a clear and 
present danger that unless forcible ac-
tion is taken, the independence or in-
tegrity of the acting state will be seri-
ously compromised. 
With these modifications, it is sub-
mitted that Falk has enunciated a useful 
framework within which decisionmakers 
can both evaluate a prospective use of 
force and d\!velop methodologies for its 
application. It has been argued that this 
approach completely ignores the pro-
scriptions of the charter law, 9 1 but this 
contention, however, ignores the fact 
that international law, to be law, re-
quires consensus and that the only 
consensus with respect to the charter 
provisions that can be observed from 
state pronouncement and practice is 
that they represent aspirational prin-
ciples rather than realistic norms by 
which states are presently willing to 
abide. 
Saying this does not derogate the 
U.N. Charter provisions. They are useful 
as a fundamental restraint in the sense 
that all applications of force start from 
the philosophical premise that they are 
suspect. However, if it is insisted that 
articles 2(3), 2(4), and 51 represent the 
"whole law and the prophets" with 
respect to the use of force, the result 
could be complete lack of inhibition on 
the part of states and total abrogation 
of even minimum conditions of public 
order. Insisting on everything would 
probably result in achieving precisely 
nothing. 
One question remains: Granted that 
Falk's criteria, as modified, appear to 
provide a framework for evaluating and 
managing the use of force, are they in 
fact illustrative of actual state practice 
which has been accepted by the world 
community? Before turning to a con-
sideration of this issue it will be helpful 
to summarize and reoJ;der the criteria. 
The use of force by states may be 
acceptable provided: 
• That acts of provocation by the 
target state have raised an imminent and 
significant threat to the continued exis-
tence of a nation's political indepen-
dence and/or territorial integrity. 
• That, if possible, a diligent effort 
has been made to obtain satisfaction by 
pacific means. 
• That recourse to international or-
ganizations is had as practicable. 
• That a state accepts the burden of 
persuasion and makes a prompt explana-
tion of its conduct before the relevant 
organ of community review, showing a 
disposition to accord respect to its will. 
• That the acting state's purpose 
cannot be achieved by acting within its 
own territory. 
• That the use of force is propor-
tional to the provocation and directed 
against military and paramilitary targets 
and clearly indicates the contours of the 
unacceptable provocation. 
• That the user of for-ce continues to 
seek a pacific settlement of the under-
lying dispute on reasonable terms. 
The Cuban Quarantine. The interdic-
tion by the United States of the intro· 
duction of Soviet nuclear missiles into 
Cuba provides an outstanding example 
of a state using coercion in a manner 
generally acceptable to a world com-
munity notwithstanding that its use did 
not properly qualify as either self-
defense, reprisal, or intervention.92 
It is true that the U.S. actions have 
subsequently been criticized by some 
publicists.93 However, in the world 
community, objection to the U.S. en-
deavor at the time was minimal-at least 
in the states beyond the sphere of 
Soviet influence.94 Moreover, the 
United Nations itself in no way con-
demned the United States and many 
states specifically affirmed the quaran-
tine.95 
With Falk's modified criteria in 
mind, it will be useful to examine the 
U.S. action. 
At the outset the United States 
amassed a body of incontrovertible evi-
dence that the Soviets were in the 
process of establishing offensive missile 
bases in Cuba. The missiles were capable 
of massive destruction throughout the 
Western Hemisphere. It was evident that 
the Soviet effort was a deliberate at-
tempt to significantly alter the status 
quo and could have serious conse-
quences for national and hemispheric 
security. 96 
With the\evidence in hand and in the 
face of a bland assurance from the 
Soviet Union that they would never 
place offensive weapons in Cuba, the 
United States developed a carefully 
orchestrated response. 9 7 First it was 
determined that the response would 
take the form of a naval "quarantine" 
rather than a military attack. The 
strongest argument against armed attack 
was that it would erode, if not destroy, 
the moral position of the United States 
throughout the world.98 The quaran-
tine would have some of the incidents 
of a blockade99 but would be limited 
initially to interdicting the shipment of 
offensive military equipment to Cuba. It 
was hoped that this limited coercive 
force would produce the desired re-
suIts. 1 00 
Having decided on a course of action, 
the United States then sought the sup-
port of the Organization of Am.erican 
States. The OAS was apprised of the 
circumstances of the threat and en-
couraged to support and cooperate in 
the U.S. action. The response was a 
unanimous affirmation of the U.S. posi-
tion, and the OAS resolved to take all 
measures necessary to terminate the 
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threat to -the peace and security of the 
hemisphere. 1 01 
The OAS resolution was immediately 
conveyed to the United Nations. The 
President of the United States almost 
simultaneously issued the Quarantine 
Proclamation and indicated that the 
quarantine would go into effect on the 
following day. This delay was provided, 
inter alia, to allow some time for the 
Soviets to divert vessels already at sea 
which were carrying prohibited cargoes. 
The United States also requested an 
urgent meeting of the U.N. Security 
Council. 1 02 
The backing of world powers was 
solicited and obtained. The OAS of 
course approved the effort, and the 
British, French, and West Germans an-
nounced their support. While Soviet 
satellite states joined with the Kremlin 
in denouncing the U.S. action as piracy, 
world opinion generally ratified the U.S. 
stand.! 03 
The quarantine was prosecuted in a 
forceful but carefully controlled man-
ner. The Navy deployed 180 ships into 
the Caribbean. The Strategic Air Com-
mand was dispersed to civilian landing 
fields around the country to lessen its 
vulnerability in case of attack. Missile 
crews were placed on maximum alert, 
and troops were moved into the south-
eastern part of the United States.! 04 
Warnings were broadcast at regular in-
tervals by the U.S. Navy. These indi-
cated that the Windward Passage, Yu-
catan Channel, and Florida Straits might 
become dangerous waters. ! 05 
The United States also announced a 
"Clearcert" plan. Shippers could obtain, 
in advance, a clearance certificate to 
send cargoes through the quarantine 
area. The purpose of this measure was 
to minimize interference with non-
offensive shipping. Concurrently, addi-
tional pressures were developed. Major 
maritime insurers ceased handling poli-
cies for the Cuban trade. Also, Soviet 
shipmen ts by air were curtailed when 
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nations refused to grant refueling privi-
leges. I 06 
The in terception of vessels by the 
Navy was to be handled in a most 
circumspect manner. If a vessel refused 
to stop, the Navy was to shoot at its 
rudders and propellers in an effort to 
disable the vessel but avoid any loss of 
life or the sinking of the ship. 1 07 The 
first vessel stopped and boarded was 
personally selected by the President. It 
was the S.S. Marula, Panamanian owned 
and under Soviet charter. The United 
States was demonstrating to the Soviets 
that it was going to enforce the quaran-
tine, and yet because Marula was not 
Soviet owned the boarding did not 
represent a direct affront requiring a 
response. 1011 
Along with the foregoing measures, 
the United States maintained constant 
communication both with Soviet diplo· 
mats and directly with Nikita Khrush-
chev. The reason for the American 
action, its limits, and the conditions for 
its termination were made crystal clear. 
Efforts were also con tinued in the 
United Nations. Every opportunity was 
given the Russians to find a peaceful 
solution which would neither diminish 
their national security nor be a public 
humiliation. 109 
As is well known, the interdiction 
was successful. The missiles were re-
moved and the quarantine was termi-
nated. A serious threat to the peace of 
the Western Hemisphere had been re-
moved by the collective application of 
force by the United States and the other 
nations of the regional alliance in such a 
manner as to be acceptable to world 
opinion. 
Evaluation. Falk's modified criteria 
reflect almost precisely the method-
ology employed by the United States in 
the Cuban incident. Objective evidence 
of provocative acts was amassed, and it 
became clear that the acts constituted a 
significant threat both to the political 
independence and territorial integrity of 
the United States. 1 1 0 Efforts Vlere 
made to peacefully resolve the matter 
with the Russians, but these proved 
unavailing in the face of their bald 
assertions that they were not intro-
ducing missiles or other offensive 
weapons into Cuba. 111 Having deter-
mined to use force, the United States 
obtained the cooperation of its regional 
organization. Moreover, both the United 
States and the OAS immediately in-
formed the United Nations, accepted 
the burden of persuasion, and clearly 
indicated a disposition to accord respect 
to its will. II 2 
Obviously the United States could 
not achieve its purpose simply by acting 
within its own territory, but its inter-
ference was not within the territory of 
any other nation but rather on the high 
seas. Moreover, the response was care-
fully circumscribed to meet the concept 
of proportionality and clearly indicated 
that the missile buildup constituted the 
unacceptable provocation. 11 J 
In this connection, the contours of 
the provocation were carefully ex-
plained to the Soviets. In a letter to 
Khrushchev immediately after the quar-
antine had been imposed, President 
Kennedy stated: 
In early September I indicated 
very plainly that the United States 
would regard any shipment of 
offensive weapons as presenting 
the gravest of issues. After that 
time, this Government received 
the most explicit assurance from 
your Government and its repre-
sentatives, both publicly and pri-
vately that no offensive weapons 
were being sent to Cuba .... In 
reliance on these solemn assur-
ances I urged restraint upon those 
in this country who were urging 
action in this matter at that time. 
And then I learned beyond doubt 
what you have not denied-
namely that all those public assur-
ances were false and that your 
military people had set out re-
cently to establish a set of missile 
bases in Cuba .... These activities 
in Cuba required the responses I 
have announced. 
I repeat my regret that these 
events should cause a deteriora-
tion in our relations. I hope that 
your Governmen t will take the 
necessary action to permit a resto-
ration of the earlier situation.! 14 
Finally, throughout the course of the 
quarantine the United States continued 
its efforts to achieve a peaceful solution 
which would be sensitive to the needs of 
its adversary. I IS The emphasis was on a 
settlement which would enable thp. 
Soviets to retreat with grace. This fi-
nally was achieved by accepting the 
Soviets' proposal that they would with-
draw the missiles if we would guarantee 
not to invad~ Cuba. IIG 
The Falk modified criteria, then, 
represent not just a theoretical offering, 
but a real and substantial framework for 
decisionmaking, one which has been 
employed successfully and generally 
accepted by the world community. Con-
versely, where these criteria have been 
largely ignored, the use of force by 
states has been subject to heavy criti-
cism. Witness the condemnation of Rus-
sia for her intervention in Czechoslo-
vakia, I 17 the criticism of the U.S. 
reten tion of forces in the Dominican 
Republic, and most recently the Indian 
invasion of East Pakistan and the over-
whelming number of Members of the 
United Nations who voted that she 
should withdraw. I 18 
CONCLUSIONS 
As indicated at the outset, the effort 
of this essay has been directed toward 
those charged with the awesome respon-
sibility of managing the use of armed 
force. The need for restraint has been 
emphasized, and yet recognition has 
been given to the demonstrable fact that 
in many situations if a state is going to 
preserve its national interests, it must 
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use force and do so unilaterally or in 
concert with its allies, but without 
reliance on the generally ineffective 
competence of the United Nations. 
Accordingly, in fulfillment of what is 
considered the legitimate legal function 
of enunciating rules of behavior having a 
consensual basis, some acceptable rem-
nants of the specific customary laws of 
self-help have been discussed and some 
general criteria for a rational employ-
ment of armed force have been evalu-
ated. It is submitted that these rules and 
criteria strike a favorable balance be-
tween the need for minimum public 
order and the requirement for national 
security and therefore have found gen-
eral acceptance in international rela-
tions. 
Quite obviously, however, they serve 
neither public order nor national se-
curity to the extent that many might 
wish. Nationalists will perceive a need 
for fewer legal inhibitions, and interna-
tionalists will generally demand greater 
rp.straints on national power. Interest-
ingly enough, upon occasion the con-
verse will also be true. Situations have 
arisen, and will continue to arise, where 
considerations of humanity will lead 
many to demand forcible and even 
unilateral intervention in the affairs of a 
state, while national self-interest will 
perceive no necessity for action and 
hence employ the argument that to 
intervene would be unjustifiable. 
It is this diversity of perception both 
in general and in specific situational 
hypotheses that makes any attempt to 
prescribe rules of behavior hazardous at 
best. Is it right or morai or just that the 
repression in East Pakistan or the geno-
cide in Biafra should be permitted to 
continue simply because it is an internal 
affair and the United Nations is power-
less to act? Is it reasonable that a stale 
should stand by and turn the other 
cheek to provocateurs bent on diluting 
its national security or threatening its 
national interests as in the Dominican 
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Republic? Or, for that matter, Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia? 
The provisions of the U.N. Charter 
would seem to answer with a resounding 
"yes," if the alternative is the use of 
armed force, and it is doubtful whether 
even the more liberal criteria which have 
been enunciated in this essay would 
admit to resort to force under these 
circumstances. By way of conclusion, it 
might be useful therefore to reflect for a 
moment on why this must be so. 
Particularly for the powerful nations 
of the world, the use of force, un· 
restrained by law or regulation, can 
become addictive as a method of 
settling disputes. It is simpler and much 
quicker than the frequently tortuous 
routes of negotiation and arbitration, 
and in the short run, it is more produc-
tive. For the'i>e reasons the use of force, 
while initially resorted to for only the 
most legitimate of reasons, can rather 
quickly become the primary option for 
the resolution of any difficulty, whether 
it be a reasonable option or not. The 
resultant disorder, even putting aside 
the current possibility of escalation to 
nuclear catastrophe, does not, it is 
submitted, in the long run confer a net 
benefit on the user of force. The discord 
and animosity created by the aggressive 
behavior cannot help but prejudice a 
state's international relations and long-
range interests. Restraint must therefore 
be exercised, if only for pragmatic 
reasons. 
Furthermore, restraint must be exer-
cised in the face of, at least from the 
perspective of the prospective user of 
force, rather severe provocations. Since 
it is impossible to draw lines which will 
clearly separate reasonable and un-
reasonable resort to force in all situa-
tions, the law must err on one side or 
the other. Here considerations of 
morality should come into play. Since 
the use of armed force necessarily en-
tails the possibility of loss of life, it is 
submitted that the rule of law and the 
conduct of nations should clearly sup-
port the view "when in doubt, don't." 
Stated more precisely, force should be 
resorted to only when it is clearly 
reasonable, and even then the quantum 
should be strictly proportionate to the 
need. 
In a way, it is strange that nations 
have been so resistant to this conceptu-
alization. Nations are, after all, made up 
of individuals, and these individuals 
have extensive domestic conditioning in 
a rule of law which, by and large, 
imposes severe limitations on individual 
resort to force. True, there are well-
known and enforceable sanctions for 
domestic violations, but it is clearly 
evident that the majority of the people 
obey the law out of a conviction that it 
represents an appropriate course of con-
duct rather than from fear of retribu-
tion. And yet when action is translated 
to the international scene, this condi-
tioning has tended to evaporate in favor 
of the notion of sovereign independence 
knowing no law other than national 
interest. 
Merely stating this paradox, however, 
suggests a solution. It is submitted that 
the bulwark of domestic adherence to 
the rule of law is the sense of com-
munity that a nation has developed over 
time. From common history and lan-
guage and experience there has evolved 
a sense of unity which supports accom-
modation to the needs of others and 
restraint in the expression of individual 
preferences. Conversely, although the 
U.N. Charter reflects a legal posture 
which presupposes the existence of such 
a sense of community among nations, it, 
in fact, does not as yet exist. 
With respect to the use of force, the 
embryonic international sense of com-
munity only admits of the restraints 
suggested in this essay, and then not 
always. Beyond this, regulation must 
proceed at a measured pace, stride for 
stride with a developing sense of inter-
national community. Decisionmakers 
can hardly be expected to assume a 
condi tion of international accom-
modation which does not exist, but if 
resort to force is ever to be eliminated, 
they must always be actively aware of 
the degree of consensus which has been 
achieved. And as 
progress is made toward more 
effective organization and cen-
tralization in the world arena, the 
hope that may be ~eld out is that 
159 
the set of policies embodying the 
restraint of coercion and the 
promotion of humanitarianism 
may rise in the balance and that 
the scope of permissible coercion 
may gradually be attentuated and 
more exacting standards of 
humanity formulated and 
applied. 1 1 9 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The Hague and Geneva Conventions governing land warfare are illustrative: Hague 
Convention No. IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the annex 
thereto; Hague Convention No. V of 1907 Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
and Persons in Case of Vlar on Land; the Geneva Conventions of 1949 concerning the 
amelioration of the condition of the sick and wounded, the treatment of prisoners of war, and 
the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Copies of these documents are contained in U.S. 
Dept. of the Army, Treaties Governing Land Warfare Pamphlet no. 21-1 (Washington: U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1956). 
2. See Richard A. Faik, "The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation," 
American Journal of In ternationaI Law, July 1969, p. 430. 
3. The problem of defining aggression has been a continuing one for the United Nations 
since its inception; to date no success has been achieved. For an extended discussion of the 
subject see generally, Julius Stone, Aggression and World Order (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1958). See also, Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and 
Minimum World Public Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 61 et seq. 
4. Both Israel and the Arab States have attempted to justify their resorts to armed force 
on the basis of art. 51 of the U.N. Charter which deals with permissible self·defense. For an 
extensive discussion of these efforts see Derek Bowett, "Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed 
Force," American Journal of International Law, January 1972, p. 1. 
5. A classic example of this can be found in the argumentation with respect to the 
competence of regional organizations to use force without the prior au thorization of the Security 
Council. It has been contended that art. 53 of the charter prohibits enforcement action without 
Security Council authorization but not preventive action. For an excellent discussion of the 
argumentation, including illustrative examples, see William O. Miller, "Collective Intervention and 
the Law of the- Charter," Unpublished Thesis, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1969, p. 31 
et seq. 
6. See Bowett. 
7. TIle only decision of the Int('rnalional Conrt of Justice to date on the i~Slle of Ihe 
legitimate usc of forcible sdf·h!'!p is II\(' C<'rfn Challlll'l C.ISt', Thl' 1I.I~Jlw, \nlt'rtI.1Ii"n.l! Court of 
Justice, Reports or Judgnwnls, lldvisol:Y Opinions .md Ordt'l"s (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1949), p. 4. 
8. See Stanley Hoffman, "International Law and the Control of Force," Karl W. Deutsch 
and Stanley Hoffman, eds., The Relevance of International Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 
1968), p. 35. 
9. In this connection, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, himself a lawyer, made 
the following remarks in discussing the Cuban quarantine: 
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine is not a legal issue. The power, 
position and prestige of the United States had been challenged by another state; and law 
simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power-power that comes close to 
the sources of sovereignty ...• No law can destroy the state creating the law. The survival 
of states is not a matter of law. 
Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, American Society of International Law, Proceedings 
of the American Society of International Law at Its Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting (Washington: 
1963), p. 14. 
10. Hoffman, p. 44. 
11. See MCDougal and Feliciano; Richard A. Falk, "The Legal Control of Force in the 
International Community," Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., Legal and Political Problems of World Order 
(New York: Fund for Education Concerning World Peace Through World Law, 1962), p. 143. 
160 
12. John Norton Moore makes the point that "Efforts to overuse international law, 
whether by way of support or criticism of rational action, serve only to obscure the vital role that 
an international legal perspective should play." John N. Moore, "Legal Dimensions of the 
Decision to Intercede in Cambodia," American Journal of International Law, January 1971, p. 
38. 
13. Falk, "Legal Control of Force," p. 143. 
14. This treaty provided for the total discontinuance of reprisal seizures on land and in 
seaports, confined the practice to the open seas, and called for the payment of a fine in the event 
of unlawful seizures. See, Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient 
Greece and Rome (London: Macmillan, 1911), v. II, p. 70, 71. 
15. Evelyn S. Colbert, Retaliation in International Law (New York: King's Crown Press, 
1948), p. II. 
16. Phillipson, v. II, p. 364. 
17. J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), p. 398. In categorizing measures of self·help, "retorsion" is frequently included as a 
fourth category. This is a measure, however, which involves legal action by states and does not 
generally involve the use of armed force. Since the present essay is concerned with the use of 
armed force which is not legal per se, a discussion of retorsion has not been included. 
18. This confusion is epitomized by Westlake who, after remarking that the right of 
self-preservation is merely that of self-defense went on to state: 
A State may defend itself, by preventive means if in its conscientious judgment necessary, 
against attack by another state, threat of attack, or preparations or other conduct from 
which an intention to attack may reasonably be apprehended .... In attack we include all 
violations of the legal rights of itself or of its subjects, whether by the offending state or 
by its subjects without due repression by it, or ample compensation when the nature of 
the case admits compensation. 
John Westlake, International Law, 1st ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 1904), v. I, p. 299; see 
also William E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 
p.322. 
19. Brierly, p. 405. 
20. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 231 et seq. 
21. This matter was not resolved judicially but precipitated diplomatic correspondence in 
the course of which Webster formulated his definition in a letter of 24 April 1841 to the British 
Ambassador in Washington, Fox, later incorporated in a note to Lord Ashburton of 27 July 
1842. Cited in Robert Y. Jennings, "The Caroline and-McLeod Cases," American Journal of 
International Law, January 1938, p. 89. 
22. Jennings, p. 89. 
23. For a critique of the Caroline test, see Robert W. Tucker, "Legal Restraints on 
Coercion," TIle United States in a Disarmed World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 
148, n. 46. 
24. While it is true that forcible self-help is still not endorsed, domestic society in the face 
of the recent efforts of minority groups and the youth movement may be coming to tolerate a 
greater degree of forcible self-help than ever before. 
25. Colbert, p. 15. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid., p. 27. 
28. Ibid., p. 54. 
29. Brierly, p. 399. Cf. Lassa F.L. Oppenheim, International Law, 7th ed., H. Lauterpacht, 
ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1952), v. II, p. 132 et seq. 
30. 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes, p. 409, 422-425. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Oppenheim, p. 141, n. 1; see also Brownlie, p. 220. 
33. Brierly, p. 403. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Humanitarian interventions by European powers occurred several times in the Turkish 
Empire during the 19th century. See Brierly, p. 403. 
36. Ibid., p. 412. 
37. League of Nations, League of Nations Official Journal 1924, p. 524. 
38. The Second Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited the employment of force for the 
recovery of contract debts. But this prohibition was itself limited. It did not apply when the 
debtor state refused or neglected to reply to an offer of arbitration or after accepting the offer 
161 
rendered settlement of the compromis impossible or, after the arbitration, failed to submit to the 
award. 
39. See Brierly, p. 408. 
40. The concept that the unilateral use of force should be foresworn also became 
embodied in the Pact of Paris of 1928-the Briand-Kellogg Pact, signed by a great many of the 
members of the international community. This pact did not perish with the League but remains 
in effect today, being fully consistent with the provisions of the U.N. Charter. War as a solution 
for international controversies and as an instrument of national policy was condemned. Peaceful 
settlement of all disputes was required. Recourse to war in self-defense, however, was not 
forbidden. On 20 June 1928 Kellogg stated, as the position of the United States, that" ... the 
right of self-defense is inherent in every sovereign state and implicit in every treaty." U.S. Dept. 
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 
1942), v. I, p. 91. 
41. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1968 (New York: Office of Public 
Information, United Nations), v. XXII, app. II. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
44. See Oppenheim, p. 152 et seq. 
45. United Nations, Yearbook 1968. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid., art. 52, para. 1. 
48. Ibid., art. 53, para. 1. 
49. See Brownlie, p. 431 et seq. 
50. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Resolution no. 2625 (XXV), 25th 
sess., supp. 28, A8028 (New York: 1971), p. 121 et seq. 
51. Ibid., p. 122. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Ibid., p. 123. 
54. See Brierly, p. 1. 
55. See Stone, p. 96. 
56. See MCDougal and Feliciano, p. 5. Their entire thesis argues that the U.N. Charter does 
not tell us what is lawful in any given situation. This is arrived at by measuring actions against 
certain realistic judgmental criteria. In this connection see particularly p. 63 of their work. 
57. See Brownlie, p. 280. 
58. United Nations, "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Final Act of the 
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security," Treaty 
Series (New York: 1948), v. XXI, no. 324, p. 77. 
59. United Nations, "Treaty of Peace with Japan," Treaty Series (New York: 1952), v. 
CXXXVI, no. 1832, art. 5, p. 46. 
60. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Report of the International Law 
Commission, 4th sess. supp. no. 10 (A/925) (Lake Success, N.Y.: 1949). See also, United 
Nations, "Treaty of Alliance, United Kingdom and Jordan," Treaty Series (New York: 1947), v. 
VI, no. 74, art. 5, p. 145; "Treaty of l\lliance and Mutual l\ssistance, United Kingdom and 
France," 1'n'.lIy SIlI'it'S (New York: 1947), v. IX, no. 137., art. 2, p. 190. 
61. See Oppenilcim, v. II, p. 154; Dr. D. Nincic in Georg Schwarzenberger, Hepor! 011 
Some Aspects of the Principle of Self-Defense in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Topics Covered by the Dubrovnik Resolution (New York: International Law Association, New 
York University Conference (1958) Committee on the Charter of the United Nations: 1958), p. 
68. 
62. United Nations, Security Council, Official Records 21st yr., 1321st mtg., 16 November 
1966, S/PV 1321 (New York: 1966), p. 17. 
63. United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 24th yr., 1466th mtg., 27 March 
1969, S/pV 1466 (New'York: 1969), p. 48; United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 
24th yr., 1468th mtg., 1 April 1969, S/PV 1468 (New York: 1969), p. 21. 
64. See "Mrs. Gandhi Said to Set Terms for Visits by Observer Teams," The New York 
Times, 17 November 1971, p. 16:7; Sidney H. Schanberg, "India and Pakistan: Short of War," 
The New York Times, 18 November 1971, p. 2:3; "Mrs. Gandhi Rejects Thant Proposal," The 
New York Times, 19 November 1971, p. 16:6; "No Reaction So Far," The New York Times, 30 
November 1971, p. 3:5. 
65. See Bowett, p. 4 et seq.; see also Brierly, p. 431. 
66. Bowett, p. 4 et seq. 
162 
bi. United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for April, May and 
June 1964, lllth mtg., 9 April 1964, S/5650 (New York: 1965), p. 9. 
68. See Brierly, p. 420. This view is also shared by a number of other publicists including 
Stone, Bowett, Waldock, and McDougal. 
69. Brierly, p. 418. 
70. At least one adherent of the restrictive view of self·defense has attempted to 
accommodate this position to the potential of nuclear weapons. Dr. M. Nagendra Singh would 
not require that self·defense wait on a physical violation of the territory of a state. Armed attack 
in his view includes those last proximate acts necessary to initiate an attack, e.g., aircraft being 
launched or submarines leaving their territorial waters. For McDougal's critical commentary on 
this accommodaJ:ion, see McDougal and Feliciano, p. 239. 
71. Ibid., p. 238 et seq. 
72. Bowett, p. I, and authorities cited therein. 
73. While initial U.S. statements indicated that the air attacks following the incident were 
retaliatory in nature, in the U.N. the U.S. Representative argued that in the face of military 
aggression his Government had decided, in self·defense, to take "positive but limited and relevant 
measures to secure its naval units against further aggression." United Nations, Security Council, 
Official Records, 19th yr., 1140th mtg., 5 August 1964, S/PV 1140 (New York: 1964), p. 2. This 
view represents a broad view of self· defense commonly called the cumulation of events doctrine, 
and there is little difference between it and precharter reprisals. 
74. The Hague, International Court of Justice, p. 4. 
75. See Brierly, p. 421 et seq.; see also Claud H.M. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of 
Force by Individual States in International Law," The Hague, Academy of International Law, 
Recueil des Cours, 1952 (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1953), v. LXXXI, p. 501. 
76. See Brierly, p. 425 et seq. 
77. Some publicists would also include humanitarian intervention as a legitimate basis for 
the use of force. The most eminent of these has been the editor of the recent editions of 
Oppenheim, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. The eighth edition of Oppenheim states that intervention is 
legally permissible "when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its 
nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience 
of mankind." Lassa F.L. Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed., H. Lauterpacht, ed. (London: 
Longmans, Green, 1955), v. I, p. 312-13. There is still some question, however, as to whether this 
type of interference in the internal affairs of another state is acceptable and therefore in this 
reasonably conservative estimate of the measures of forcible self·help which are legitimate, 
humanitarian intervention has not been included. It is suggested that intervention of this type 
may better be left to the United Nations rather than individual states. 
78. See statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk as quoted in Jay Mallin, Caribbean 
Crisis (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 58. 
79. White House Press Release, 28 April 1965, Documents on Anierican Foreign Relations, 
1965 (New York: Harper, 1966), p. 234. 
80. See Miller, p. 54. 
81. United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution no. 2625, p. 123. 
82. Even Brownlie, who adopts a very strict view of what force can legitimately be applied 
in modern law concedes that 
.•. the protection of nauonals presents particular difficulties and ..• a government faced 
with a deliberate massacre of a considerable number of nationals in a foreign state would 
have cogent reasons of hUmanity for acting •.. The possible risks of denying the legality 
of action ini a case of such urgency ... must be weighed against the more calculable 
dangers of providing legal pretexts for the commission of breaches of the peace in pursuit 
of national rather than humanitarian interests. Brownlie, p. 30l. 
83. Brierly, p. 431. 
84. Ibid. 
85. The United States has always taken the position and amply demonstrated that its 
intervention in Vietnam only occurred after it had been clearly determined that the subversion of 
South Vietnam was being directed from North Vietnam. 
86. While the argument was never made, it might be contended \vith some justification that 
India's intervention in Pakistan falls in the category of a special case; that the flow of Bengali 
refugees into India was similar to the negligent use by Pakistan of its natural resources. It is 
submitted, however, that this argument probably stretches the limited "special cases of 
necessity" beyond acceptable limits. 
87. Brownlie, p. 376. 
88. See generally Bowett; see also Miller. 
163 
89. See Falk, "Beirut Raid," p. 441; cf. Yehuda Z. Blum, "The Beirut Raid and the 
International Double Standard. A Reply to Professor Richard A. Falk," American Journal of 
International Law, January 1970, p. 73. 
90. Cf. N.G. Onuf, "The Current Legal Status of Reprisals," Unpublished Manuscript 
submitted to the American Society of International Law, Panel on Reprisals and Retaliation in 
International Law: 1971, p. 19. 
91. Ibid. 
92. No attack against the United States was imminent, hence self-defense under the 
Caroline case test was not a legitimate basis for the quarantine. Likewise, no acknowledged right 
was being denied to establish a "Corfu Channel" type reprisal action. Finally, neither protection 
of nationals, requested intervention against an external threat, nor a "special case of necessity" 
was present so as to justify the intervention. Professor Carl Q. Christol has stated that the Cuban 
action constructed a new rule of international law. Carl Q. Christol and Charles R. Davis, 
"Maritime Quarantine: the Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to 
Cuba, 1962," American Journal of International Law July 1963, p. 525. 
93. See Quincy Wright, "The Cuban Quarantine," American Journal of International Law, 
July 1963, p. 546, and authorities cited therein. 
94. Russia and her satellites condemned the action as piracy and contended that the 
United States was engaged in unprecedented aggressive action. See Christol and Davis, p. 528. 
95. Although a resolution condemning the quarantine was presented to the Security 
Council by the Soviet Union, the Council by general consent refrained from acting upon it. It has 
even been argued that the failure to condemn and the Council's encouragement of negotiations to 
resolve the matter indicates ex post facto authorization by the Security Council. See Leonard C. 
Meeker, "Defensive Quarantine and the Law," American Journal of International Law, July 
1968, p. 515. 
96. See Christol and Davis, p. 526. 
97. Andrei Gromyko personally gave these assurances to President Kennedy, although the 
President knew at the time that offensive missiles were being installed. Some weeks previously 
Ambassador Dobrynin had assured Robert Kennedy that there would be no ground-to-grouhd 
missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. See Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, (New 
York: Norton, 1969), p. 25, 41. 
98. Ibid., p. 49. 
99. See Wright, p. 554; see also Kennedy, p. 48. 
100. See Christol and Davis, p. 527. 
101. Ibid., p. 528; see also Kennedy, p. 51. 
102. "U.S. Request for Meeting of Security Council," The Department of State Bulletin, 12 
November 1962, p. 724. 
103. Theodore C. Sorenson. Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row. 1965). p. 706; see also 
Arthur M. SChlesinger. Jr .• A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 815. 
104. Kennedy, p. 52. 
105. See Department of the Navy. Oceanographic Office, Notice to Mariners, No. 47 
(Washington: 1962). p. 2547-48; see also Jack Raymond. "Navy Tells Ships of Danger Areas." 
The NI'w York Thill'S. 25 October 1962. p. 20:6. 
106. In this conllcction the United Slates reccived slIpport rrolll J\rrican counlries Ihatll.,d 
been considered antagonistic. Guinea. Senegal. and Algeria rerused to permit Soviet aircraft to 
land or refuel. Kennedy. p. 122; see also Schlesinger. p. 815. 
107. Kennedy. p. 61. 
108. Ibid .• p. 82. . 
109. Ibid .• p. 124. 
110. See the Falk modified criteria as summarized and reordered in previous discussion, first 
item. 
Ill. Ibid., second item. 
112. Ibid., third and fourth items. 
113. Ibid., fifth and sixth items. 
114. Kennedy, p. 80. 
115. See Falk's modified criteria, seventh item. 
116. Kennedy, p. 103. 
117. In addition to other countries, almost all the Members of the Security Council 
condemned as illegal the action of the Soviet Union. Sec "Situation in Czechoslovakia: Security 
Council Considers Item." UN Mon thly Chronicle, August-September 1968, p. 34 et seq. 
118. Eric Pace, "U.N. Vote Follows Pleas for Action," The New York Times, 8 December 
1971, p. 1:5. 
119. McDougal and Feliciano, p. 59. 
164 
BELLIGERENCY AND LIMITED WAR 
William O. Miller 
When J was asked if I would give this 
presentation, I wondered if the title, 
"Belligerency and Limited War," was 
cast in technical legal terms--that is, 
does it mean belligerency in its generally 
accepted legal sense--and does it mean 
"war" in its generally accepted legal 
sense--or docs it mean a situation wherc 
there is no technical state 0 f war but, 
ncvertheless, where therc is a largc-sealc 
armed conflict raging. 
This is an extrcmely important con-
sideration, for the technical cxistence of 
a state of war, in the traditional law, has 
been a prerequisite for the legitimacy, in 
a legal sensc, of certain types of actions. 
For example, the term "blockade" is a 
term unknown in the law .except as it 
connotes a belligerent blockade in time 
of war. 
This has always seemed to me to be a 
somcwhat less than adcquate manner of 
viewing tlw problem. Thc real problem, 
it scems to me, is thc nced to dctcrmine 
what dC/,'l"ce of forcc, applied in what 
manner, against what targets, may states 
reasonably expect acceptance by the 
majority of other states. 
But until just reccntly lhis enlirc 
prohlt'lII Il<Is h('(~n approadlt:tI hy allllost 
all of OUI" inlernalional law puhlieisls--
and, indeed; by thc slates themselves--
from thc two polar extrcmes--therc was 
a "law of peace" anti there was a "law 
of war." Almost all of the major works 
in the international law field arc divided 
into two parts--one on war, the other on 
peace. 
What I think we should ask ourselves 
in any study of this topic is how much 
real utility docs the dichotomy of a law 
of war and law of peacc provid(~ to us, 
and I think we wiII come up with the 
answer that in a contcmporary situation 
it provides little utility at all. 
Let's take a look just for a minute at 
thc situation in Vietnam. \V ar or peace'? 
Or docs it rcally maLLer frolll a legal 
standpoint? 
As a factual matter, what wc have 
there is a conflict of major proportions. 
But, as we are all aware, there is no 
tcchnical state of war in cxistellce. You 
have read the memorandum from the 
Defense Department to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee in which it 
was stated that the present situation 
imposes no obstacles on us in the 
pursuance of our objectivcs in Vietnam, 
and I have no doubt that this is true, 
But what if our ohjectives should broml-
en and it was considered necessary to 
restrict the inflow of goods into North 
Vietnam? I know you have often heard 
it said that we cannot blockade Ilai· 
phong because it is not legal, bccause 
blockade is legal only in time of war. J 
have also hearll it said that the prcsent 
coastal surveillance measures by the 
South Vietnamese cannot extend be-
yond 12 miles from their eoast--heyond 
their contiguous zone--beeause it is il-
legal, except in unusual circumstances in 
time of peace, to exercise control over 
the ships of another state beyond that 
limit. Thc effcct of these statements is 
simply that the Republic of Vietnam/ 
United States cannot insist on hellig-
erent rights beeailse a state of war docs 
not l:xisL. 
TIll' ('OIlVl'('l\(1 ilia\, havl: IH'ell tnll: ill 
tht: Ullited Arab I{ejlliblic's blockm": of 
the Israeli port of 1·:lath. Was this 
"blockmle" legal or illegal? It depends 
on what law you apply-the law of war 
or the law of peace. Clearly, I think that 
if the U.A.R. possessed belligerent 
rights--that is if a slate of war existed 
hetween Israel and the U.A.R.-their 
actions were legal. It would be to Ihe 
contrary, however, if they did not 
possess belligerent rights. The hasic posi-
tion of the United States on this point 
was that belligerent rights did not exist 
heeause of a 195B Security Council 
R(lsolution which stated the prior armis-
tice had ended the war and that neither 
liide could lehritimatcly claim helligen:nt 
ri~hlli. lIence, it was said, the 1958 
Geneva Convention providing for free 
passage through international straits was 
the controlling rule. The Egyptians, on 
the other hand, !lased their position 
essentially on the fact that there was, 
indeed, a state of war existing, that it 
had merely been suspended for a time 
hy the armistice, and that they con-
sidered it necessary for their security to 
prevent inllux of strategic goods. Also, 
they very pointedly noted that the 1958 
(;mu:va C:onventions were intelult:d to 
r(:l-(ulate peacetime, and not wartime, 
rcla tio ns. 
The point here is that there are such 
things as belligertmt rights, rights which 
cxist only in a technical state of war. 
I\lany today contend that this state of 
the law docs not satisfactorily treat the 
contemporary situation where we don"t 
really have "war" in its traditional and 
technical sense, and where we don't 
really have "peace," hut where we must 
l":al with something in he tween. I have 
also heard it said that this war/peace 
dichotomy docs not really or effectively 
pn:s(:ril,,: a norm of l:oIIIluet for a state. 
If OIII:'S nctions are iIIegnl when placed 
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in the "peace" euhbyhole, legality can 
be be:;towed on them hy designating the 
situation in which they occur as "war." 
While the thrust of this statement 
lIlay he true to some uegree, it is, of 
course, by no means true that the 
uesignation of a conflict as "war" is a 
step to be taken merely to legalize some 
act; for when one party to a conflict 
considers whether it should insist on 
belligerent righ'ts, it must also consider a 
host of other factors, not the least of 
which arc the treaty relations of its 
opponent which the existence of a state 
of war may bring into play, and most 
important by that the exercise of bellig-
erent rights will impose reciprocal re-
strictions upon neutrals, restrictions 
which those neutrals Illay be loath to 
aeeepL. lienee, the importance, power, 
anu i~lclinations of so·ealleu neutral 
powers and the effect that belligerent 
restrictions on their normal rights will 
have are extremely important considera-
tions. 
This can be illustrated by the tradi-
tional law of war as it relates to the 
belligerent right to embargo sea com-
merce to and from its enemy--to stop 
the flow of goods, both inward and 
outward, which enhances the enemy's 
warmaking effort. 
The particular method for accom-
plishing this purpose, which I want to 
discllss, is tlw traditional or the IH:llig-
erent hlockade. 
Blockade was originally coneeivcd 
and executed as the maritime counter-
part of siege. It was the total prohibi-
tion of maritime communication, in-
ward or outward, with a uesignateu 
portion of the enemy's coastline. Its 
foclIs was, and is, on ships, unlike the 
law of contrabanu where the focus is on 
cargo. Blockaue is ucfined as the bellig-
erent right to prevent vessels of all states 
from entering or leaving specified ports 
or coastal areas which arc under the 
sovereignty, occupation, or control of 
the enemy. This could include tllll 
whole 0 f th e enemy coastline, as indeed 
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it did during the American Civil War 
when the Union forces maintained a 
blockade of the entire Confederate 
coas!. 
Blockade, by its nature, involves not 
only illler[erellee with vessels flying the 
enemy's flag, but also with vessels flying 
the flag of neutral states. One of the 
most fundamental considerations in 
blockade is that it applies to belligerent 
and neutral vessels alike; hence, one of 
the restrictions of neutrals which I 
mentioned a moment ago, restrictions 
Oil a state's otherwise legally un-
restricted right to trade with whomso-
ever it wishes. Neutral states, therefore, 
traditionally insisted that the enforce-
ment of a blockade must be in ac-
cordance with strict and clear rules, the 
first of which being that the blockade 
must be enforced impartially against 
ships of all states. If ships of some states 
are permitted through and those of 
others are not, then a blockade in its 
lcgal sense may not be said to exist. The 
Unitcd States used this point as basis for 
its strenuous objcctions in thc British 
blockade of Gcrmany in World War I 
which significantly interfercd with U.S. 
trade to German ports but did not 
restrict Scandinavian trade to these 
same ports. 
The blockading state must co In-
mence the blockade with notification to 
all nations as to when the operation is 
to begin and the area to be affeded. In 
this latter regard the bloekadc must not 
be so designed as to bar access to, or 
departure from, neutral ports or coast-
lines. This was intended to ensure that 
the blockade docs not interfere with 
strictly neutral trade. 
Next, the blockade must be effective. 
That is, it must be maintained by 
sufficient force to make blockade run-
ning hazardous, and it must involve a 
high degree of risk. The blockade of the 
Confederate coast, which I mentioned, 
was contested on this ground by some 
neutral SUltcs whose vessels were apprc-
IWI\(led. The blockaded coastlilll: was 
ahout 3,000 milcs in length, and there 
were only about 4·5 Union ships patrol-
ling the area. As a consequence, many 
blockade runners managed to gct 
through. NeverthcIess, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had little difficulty in deter-
mining that the blockade was effective, 
so as to make legal the condemnation in 
prize of the ships which were captured. 
Breach of a blockade occurs when a 
vessel, having knowledge of the block-
ade, passes through or attempts to pass 
through it en route to or from the 
blockaded area. 
The penalty for breach, or attcmpted 
breach, is the confiscation of both the 
ship and its cargo, whether contraband 
or not. 
I emphasize here that the liability of 
the blockade runner is to capture, and 
condemnation is the prize. The block-
ade runner could not be destroyed 
unless she resisted or fled, and unless 
destruction was necessary. 
What I have just described is the 
traditional, or close-in, blockade. This 
does not mean that the hlockade force 
must be disposed close-in to the enemy 
coastline or port, but it docs mean that 
the blockading force must be so de-
ployed that neutral vessels bound for 
neutral ports wiII not have to pass 
through the blockade line, and thus 
subject themscIves to being boarded and 
searched, and possibly seized for a 
blockade breach. This highlights one of 
the basic problems of the traditional 
blockade in modern times-the deploy-
ment of the blockading force close-in to 
the blockaded area may be impossible 
from an operational viewpoint, and geo-
graphical considerations make it impos· 
sible, in most regions, to blockade fur-
ther at sea and not interfere with 
innocent neutral shipping or bar access 
to neutral ports. 
Accordingly, we have seen in modern 
warfare the almost total disuse of the 
traditional blockade. While there were 
some minor close-in blockades during 
World War I, nonc were of ,IllY fI'al 
significance; and World War Il rcportcd 
only one incident of its use--the Soviet 
blockade of the Finnish coast in 1940. 
Thcre wcrc, of COllr:;l', blockade:; of a 
type during both World War I and World 
War 11, but these were not blockades in 
the traditional ser se, and they were 
never sought to be justified as such. 
They were frequently referred to as 
long-distance blockades since they in-
volved elosing and patrolling large areas 
of the high seas, hundreds of miles from 
the enemy's coastline. In both wars the 
British blockades of Germany consisted 
principally of controlling the northern 
and southern approachcs of the North 
Sea, thereby restricting access to some 
neutral ports as well as German ports. 
And the Germans, as you know, by the 
usc of war zones blockaded the whole 
of the British Isles. Both sides employed 
new wcapons for the enforcement of 
these long-distance blockades. Where in 
prior wars the surface man-of-war was 
the weapon utilized for commerce con-
trol, belligerents now supplemented the' 
surface fleets with the submarine, the 
aircraft, and the mine. War zones were 
established by all belligerents through 
which passage was prohibited or re-
stricted and made extremely dangerous 
by a combination of these weapons. 
Thus, large areas of the seas were mincd 
by the British, Germans, and later by 
the United States; mill neutral shipping 
was cautioncd to stay out and wcrc told 
that if they desired to pass through the 
area on an innocent voyage, to funnel 
through eertain designated areas where 
inspection of their eargo eould be facili-
tated. 
As another method of control, the 
British established a system of issuing 
"navieerts" to neutral vessels transiting 
the blocka{)ed area en route to neutral 
ports. Under this system a vessel, legiti-
mately engaged in neutral trade, could 
obtain. a naviccrt at its port of last 
loading which atLested to the innocence 
of its cllrgo anci destination. Upon 
n'lIching t h(' hlockllliccillrt!a, till! neutral 
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vcssel wOl~hl be allowcd to pass un-
hiJlllercd'- Similarly, a neutral ship ou t-
bound from a neutral port from within 
tlw hloekaded arell could ohtllin a navi-
cert aLLe:;ting to the lIollelwmy origin of 
its (:argo. This systcm had the effect of 
greatly facilitating the enforcement of 
the British blockade and, lit the same 
time, minimizing delays in such neutral 
trade as the British were willing to 
permit. 
Let me just summarize thc thrce 
principal departures from the traditional 
rules which characterized the blockadcs 
of both sides in both World War J and 
World War H: 
1. L~stablishmcnt of war zoncs in 
largc areas of the high scas, rcstricting 
acccss to ncu tral ports and making 
transit through thesc zones dangerous 
by thc usc of mincs, submarines, and 
aircraft: wcapons systcms which wem 
unable to exercise the traditional 
method of blockade control--eapture of 
the blockadc runner. 
2. Therefore, subjecting ships at-
tempting to pass to destruction rather 
than capture and condemnation in 
prize, as the penalty for breach or 
atLempted breach of the blockade; and 
3. Ahnost total control of, instead of 
minimal intcrferenee with, bona fide 
neutral comml'rec. 
I want to point out again that thrse 
actions were never supported, in a Icgal 
sense, under the traditional law of 
blockade. They were justified, rllther, 
undcr the law of reprisals as actions 
which, although iIIegal, are rendercd 
legal by virtue of a prior unlawful act of 
the enemy. Whatever the legal justifica-
tion, the real significance of this action 
lies in the fact that these departures 
from the old rules were made not just 
011 occasions but persistently through-
out the major wars by all participallts. 
Thus, I would say the old rules, by this 
course of conduct, were shown to have 
lost their validity as law, if we mean by 
law a standard of conduct to which we 
can expect general community allhcr-
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ence. Many contend, however, that 
these departures from the old rules must 
be viewed strictly in their reprisal con-
l('xl ml(lthal as slII'l1 tlwy merely reflect 
the operation of sanctions for tlw iIIcl!al 
conduct of lhc opposing hclligerent and 
that hence they can obtain no color of 
legality except as such. 
Professor Lauterpacht, however, 
states what I think is the better view in 
this manner: 
Measures regularly and uniformly 
repeated in successive wars in the form 
of reprisals and aiming at the economic 
isolation of the opposing belligerent, 
must be regarded as a development of 
the latent principle of blockade, name-
ly tlmt the belligerent who possesses 
effective command of tile sea is en-
titled to deprive his opponent thcreof 
for tllC purpose eitlICr of navigation by 
his own vessels or of conveying on 
neutral vesscls such goods as are dcs-
tined to or originate from him. 
In other words, new condilions have 
demandcd new laws, and thcy should 
have them. This was seen at the outset 
by Grand Admiral Tirpitz, who has been 
referred to as the father of German 
submarine warfare. lie said this in his 
memoirs: 
Had we dealt ,vith the submarine 
campaign eooly and consistently, wc 
should have prepared thc ground for 
the view that the campaign was not 
mcrely justifiable as a reprisal against 
thc starvation blockadc (which, unfor-
tunately, waS lIw (lilly argulIII'lIt put 
forward on our behalf), but that it was 
clearly and irrefutably justificd by tile 
maritime law created by the English 
themselves at tile beginning of the war. 
The new weapon could not be bound 
by tile rules made in tile old sailing 
days of a ecntury ago, but had a right 
to a new law. Docs anyone seriously 
believe that in any future war a people 
fighting for its life will not use the 
submarine as we have used it in this 
war, evcn if the rules of international 
law forbid them to do so. 
The point I want to make here, and, 
indeed, in this entire prcsentation, is 
that wi'th the broadening scope of a 
hclligcrcnt's ohjectivcs--in hoth Worlel 
Wars, the total subjugation of the 
encmy--and with the development of 
new wcapons through which these ob-
jcctives can he sought, a ncw look is 
rcquired at thc Icgal framework hy 
which the world cOlllmunity sceks to 
regulate the conflict. Given, then, a 
legitimate military objcctive-and ccr-
tainly, in modcm warfarc, commerce 
which strengthens the enemy's war ef-
fort can be a legitimate military objec-
tive--we must expect those measurcs to 
be used which can effectively restrict 
that commerce and which the bellig-
erent has at hand. Any legal system 
which does not adequately deal with the 
practicalities of the situation will be just 
as ineffective as the old blockade rules 
were in the two preccding major wars. 
These rules on blockadc were simply 
not sufficiently realistic as to compel 
general adherence in either of these 
giant conflicts. So, it seems to me that 
in this context of all·out war, they were 
shown to have lost their status as law. 
Now I do not mean that these 
principles have totally lost their useful-
ness for, perhaps, we can envision a 
situation where we could expect to sec 
general adherence to them. 
A small war, betwecn smaller states, 
where political objectives remain well 
limited and where the geographical 
situation is appropriate ma), very well 
sec an old traditional type blockmle. As 
a maLLer of faeL. wc saw sOJllething akin 
to this in the Egyptian blockade of the 
Israeli port of Elath. I say "akin" to the 
traditional blockade because the U.A.H.. 
emphasis was not on shipping but on 
strategic goods. That is to say, Egypt 
did not bar all shipping through the 
Straits of Tiran, but only harred items 
of strategic goods. She announced that 
all Israeli shipping, of course, would be 
fired upon, but that neutral shipping 
would be required to stop for inspection 
of their cargo and that any attempt by a 
neutral to ship strategic goods to Israel 
would be considercd an unfriendly act 
against all Arah slales. 
Thl'n' al:;o was a tr;lIlitional hloek;lIle 
hy the United States ap;ainst the North 
Korean coast tluring the Korcan war 
whcm then' was a fm mahle p;cohrraphic 
situation and liJlli ted political objcc-
tivcs. This hlockade, according to 
l\lessrs. Cagle and Manson, was success-
fully maintained for 3 years. And, yes, 
hoth Soviet and Chinese Communist 
vessels respected the hlockade, although 
hoth governments denounced it and 
refused to recognize its legality or even 
its existence. 
I would like now to discuss three 
other, but related, situations with you. 
The first is the old 19th century 
concept of pacific blockade--a term 
which one hears handied ahout from 
time to time. This action has heen 
deserihed as a measure short of war, i.e., 
where the hlockading slate docs not 
wish to resort to war but, nevertheless, 
wishes to resort to some degree of force 
to ohtain redress of a claimed wrong hy 
the opposing slate. Hence, pacific block-
ades arose as a form of reprisal used in a 
peacetime situation generally by larger 
states against those less powerful. It 
consisted of hlockading aeecss to or exit 
from a particular port or ports of the 
target state, of the vessels of that state. 
Only the shipping of the blockaded 
state was affected. Neutral ships, or 
ships of other nations, an~ permiLled to 
C()ml~ mill go i1S they please. There are 
no rc(:orclcd iw;Lancl:H of this "eing IIHI:(\ 
in this century, and there arc no in-
stances where it was ever used by the 
United States. I mention it here just so 
that you will be able to distinguish it 
from the belligerent type blockade if 
the need arises. 
There arc other measures short of 
war which hear some relevance to the 
use of seapower in a limitcd war situa-
tion. I refer to the basic right of every 
staLe to take such actions at sea as are 
reasonable and necessary to protect its 
security interest against the hostilc acts 
of oLher states. The old case of the U.S. 
Flagship I';r#;/I ilL.~ is fl"~II'u:ntly eitell in 
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supporL of this proposiLion. This ship 
was seized hy the Spanish authorities in 
LB7;~ while it was in the proce:;s of 
transporting arms to Cuhan insllrgcnts. 
The British ship J)eerholLllcl was seizcd 
by Spanish warships during the Spanish 
Civil War for the same reason. And 
during the Algerian War, French war-
ships stopped at leasl lWo ships--one a 
British and one a Yugoslav, both of 
which were suspected of the same of-
fense. 
The current Market Time operations 
in Vielnam arc also pertinent to our 
discussion. The Republic of Vietnam 
decree announcing this operation Slated, 
essentially, that the entry into South 
Vietnam of goods or personnel through 
other than recognized ports is forbiddcn 
by the South Vietnamese customs and 
immigration regulations and that it was 
intended to enforce these regulations 
strictly. Accordingly, it providcd thal all 
vessels within the Repuhlic of Vietnam 
contiguous zone were subjcct to visit 
and search, and arrest where appro-
priate, for violations of these regula-
tions. It wenl a bit further and declared 
that even beyond their contiguous zone, 
ships suspected of being RVN, although 
flying another flag, would be stopped, 
searched, and seized if appropriate. 
South Vietnam has done nothing 
here, of course, that a state cannot 
legally do in time of peace under the 
19!iB Geneva Conventions. These are 
stricLly police measurcs designed to en-
force the domestic laws of the RVN 
seaward throughout their sanitnry, 
fiscal, amI customs ZOlle, or contiguous 
zone, and Oil lhe high seas against ships 
suspected of heing their own although 
flying a foreign flag. 
!VIay I simply pose this question to 
you? Does the Virgin ills case, alHl the 
others I cited a moment ago, suggest a 
ralionale for a possible extension of this 
surveillance? 
A fi nOlI blockade-type situation 
which c(lInpds ollr attention is t he IIH:j 
lJuaranlinr of stratep;ie arllls to Cuba. 
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This exercise of force at sea was de-
signed by the United States as a re-
sponse to the Soviet/Cuban missile 
thn!at and, el'rtainly, as a IIH:asure 
whieh, it was hoped, eould re:mlve the 
situation short of aetual conflict. 
I call this a blockade-type situation 
because it was not a blockade in any 
sense of the word--you will recall that I 
commenced my remarks with the nota-
tion that blockade deals with ships, 
solely, and not their cargo. 
There was never any intention in the 
Cuhan situation to prevent the ingress 
of ships. The entire thrust of the opera-
tion, of course, was on offensive missiles 
and their component parts. Ships were 
stopped, and those whieh were not 
transporting the prohibited items were 
permitted to eontinue their voyage, and 
a clearcert, or clearance certi ficate, 
system, modeled a fter the old naviccrt 
system was initiated to obviate even this 
ineonvenience for ships carrying inno-
cent cargo. This really bears a close 
resemblance to the prohihition of con-
traband, also a belligerent right under 
the traditional law of sea warfare. Bear 
in mind here that there never was any 
intention, on anyhody's part, that a 
state of war should exist between the 
United States and Cuba, or the United 
States and the Soviet Union, although 
what has traditionally been a helligerent 
right was, in essence, exercised. 
This, I thillk, delllollHLraLC:K Illy tlH:His 
thaL changing conditions require chang-
ing rules and that a law of peace and law 
of war dichotomy is inadequate in such 
eonLclllporary situaLions. 
Clearly, the UniLed States could have 
declared war Oil Cuha, established a 
hlockadc, or annolillced lists of contra-
band itcms; although, undoubtedly, 
many would have cried that the declara-
tion of war, itself, was violative of 
article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. But 
putting this argument aside for a :no-
ment. it el'rtainly l:'Cl'IllS obvious that a 
forIllal statc of war sh()uld not be 
reljuired for a state to insist on certain 
essential protecLive rights since such 
would have undoubtedly prejudiced Lhc 
chances for a peaceful solution of the 
matter. 
Of course, the lawyers have waxed 
long and hard on the legality of the 
quarantine. Some puhlicists, cvcn some 
U.S. publicists, have branded it as an 
unlawful exercise of force under article 
2(4) of the Charter. Others, and these 
are substantially in the preponderance, 
have argued for its legality, although not 
always using the same yardstick. The 
official U.S. position is that the action 
was legal as a collective action by the 
American states under articles 6 and 8 
of the Rio Treaty in response to a 
situation endangering the peace of 
America. Others contend that it was a 
legitimate exercise of the right of collec-
tive self-defense undcr article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter. 
These latter arguments seem to me to 
he the more realistic ones and, as such, 
to he a much more useful part of the 
continuing development of standards of 
conduct to which we can generally 
expect states to conform. To brand as 
illegal under present law every exercise 
of armed force, as some do, invites 
comments like those of former Secre-
tary of State Dean Acheson to the 
American Society of International Law, 
shortly after the quarantine. 
I must concludc that the propriety 
of the Cuban quarantinc is not a h:gal 
issue. Thc powcr, position, and prestige 
of the United States had been chal-
lenged by another statc: and law 
simply does not deal with such ques-
tions of ultimate power-·power that 
comes close to the sources of sover-
eignty. I cannot believe that there arc 
principles of law that say we must 
aeccpt destruction of our way of life. 
One would be surprised if practical 
men, traincd in legal history and 
thought, had devised and brought to a 
state of gencral acceptance, a principle 
condemnatory of an action so cssential 
to the continuation C(f precmincnt 
pOWl'r as that taken by the United 
Statcs last Octobl'r. Such a principle 
would bc as hannful to the devdoll' 
ment of restraining procedures as it 
would be futile. No law can destroy 
thr state creating the law. The survival 
of states is not a matter of law. 
Whether or not 01\(: ahrrecs fully with 
th($e n'lIIl1rks, I do I hink onl! must 
abrrl!e that they do point out c1eurIy that 
in order for restruining procedures to 
huve any hope of effectiveness, they 
must be premised on a realistic appraisal 
of what states can be expected to do in 
particular circumstances. 
Now, what is the relevance of all of 
this to my subject--the legality of the 
use of certain weapons in a limited war 
situation? . 
While we do have some rules of 
international law in sea warfare which 
appear definite and certain on their 
face, this is by no means the true 
situation. I\lost of these ;ulcs were 
d1w(·I0l'l·tI in allll for a totally tliffl'rent 
(mvirolllnent than we face today. While 
there are, and must be, restraints on the 
participants in a conflict, whether or 
not that conflict is characterized as a 
technical state of war, I think history 
teaches us that the degree of effective 
restraint will vary in inverse proportion 
to the nature of the objectives for which 
tJle conflict is being waged; that is, as 
the objectives become more unlimited, 
the fewer restraints we can expect the 
parties to impose upon themselves, und, 
hence, the fewer constraints the world 
community, in the form of law, can 
hope to impose. 
The traditional blockade which we 
have been discussing provides a good 
example of this. When faced with a war 
where the total, organized resources of 
thc enemy became a legitimate military 
objective, the old rules which sought to 
separate noncombatants from com-
batants at sea were not adequate. Nor 
were those which failed to make allow-
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anees for the effect which otherwise 
normal neutral trade would have on the 
enemy's war effort. Thus the old 19th 
century law failed under the strict test 
of mili~ary necessity in a modern con-
text. 
But to get back to my subject, I will 
simply say that in limited war situa-
tions, where objectives are limited, there 
will be more self-imposed restraints and, 
hence, more constraints in the form of 
law that can hope to be imposed: 
In the Vietnamese situation, for ex-
ample, our self-imposed restraints arc 
such that we make no effort at all to use 
force to interfere with the seaborne 
trade into North Vietnam. 
This situation Ii light very well be 
otherwise, however, if there were to be, 
for example, a massive invasion across 
the DMZ. It could very well be that the 
defense of South Vietnam would re-
quire interdiction of North Vietnamese 
strategic commerce. This situation did 
develop in Korea. It would not be 
unrealistic, therefore, to expect, given 
the right circumstances, something in 
the nature of a traditional blockade of 
the North Vietnamse coast. 
In seeking to determine the legality 
of a proposed action, one should not 
only look to such rules as are found in 
such publications as The Law of Naval 
Warfare, but he must also study the 
history of these rules, i.e., the situation 
for which they were designed and the 
history of their application. lIe must' 
also recognize that there are many 
situations which are simply not covered 
in the rule books--and it is here, particu-
larly, where the practice of states, if it 
can be determined, will make possible a 
hetter and more meaningful appraisal. 
As Professor Morgenthau stated the 
other day, "We deal not with theory, 
but with experience." 
----0/----
